Verification for Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control

On 5 December 2013, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) and the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) co-hosted the first seminar in a series on disarmament verification, featuring internationally renowned expert Dr. Dimitri Perricos, former Acting Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC); Andreas Persbo, executive director, VERTIC; and Dr. Nikolai Sokov, senior fellow, VCDNP. The event was moderated by Elena Sokova, executive director of the VCDNP.

Verification: Past Lessons and Present Challenges

In his presentation, Dr. Perricos described past events that presented challenges for safeguards and verification and which triggered efforts to enhance their efficiency. The 1974 Indian nuclear test, for example, revealed that facility-specific (INFCIRC/66-type) safeguards agreements were not effective against proliferation. He described how the verification system was modified over time to meet the changing needs, and pointed to the 1988 UN Disarmament Commission's Sixteen Principles of Verification, which declared, inter alia, that "[a]dequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements".

However, despite positive developments in verification toward these sixteen principles, the verification challenges experienced in the 1990s demonstrated that the system of safeguards was not geared to detect a state's clandestine nuclear weapon-related development or acquisition. Dr. Perricos discussed general requirements for successful verification: first, verification systems, technologies, and methods should adapt as the requirements change; and second, sufficient information and access to locations must be granted.

Adaptability

Technological sophistication of the nuclear fuel cycle has, over time, required the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop additional verification tools and methods, such as containment and surveillance, sensors, unattended monitoring, and consistency analysis; nevertheless, the most important verification tool remains the safeguards inspector. In 1991, these tools were an integral part of the successful response to UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687, under which the completeness and correctness of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) declarations were verified. The unprecedented extent of the Iraqi verification project tested the safeguards system, requiring it to develop technologies and expertise that were later used in both South Africa and in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); namely, the collection and analysis of forensic data including imagery and environmental sampling. The 2003 announcement by Libya of its heretofore clandestine nuclear weapon program also provided the IAEA with additional experience, especially regarding analysis of transnational proliferation networks.

In addition to tools and methods, organizations also require adaptation. The Iraq case highlighted how existing legal instruments, verification structures, and verification approaches were insufficient against potential proliferation. In response to this inadequacy, states created the model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997, which allows for additional IAEA access to locations and information and corrected some of the identified omissions of INFCIRC/153-type agreements.

Access to Locations and Information

Verification of Iraq's declaration was possible largely due to the unfettered access required under UNSC Resolution 687. Similarly, the verification of both the correctness and completeness of South Africa's 1991 initial inventory declaration and of the 1993 dismantlement of its nuclear weapon program was possible because of the access that was granted to the IAEA team (supplemented by nuclear weapon experts). Such access has not been granted in all cases. In the case of the 1992 IAEA detection of inconsistencies in the DPRK, North Korea did not grant the Agency sufficient access to allow for early resolution of the crisis. Although the United States and the DPRK reached an Agreed Framework in 1994 which froze the nuclear program and allowed access for IAEA inspections, in 2003, the inspectors were thrown out and the DPRK withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

As a part of their safeguards obligations, IAEA member states provide information about their nuclear fuel cycle, including information about their material balances and facility design information. This information is then verified by performing consistency analysis, such as comparing state declarations with results of on-site inspections, follow-up interviews, production records, and import-export control records. More information allows for more confident verification and detection of possible inconsistencies. Although South Africa was only required under its safeguards agreements to provide five years of highly enriched uranium production records, its willingness to provide fifteen years of records allowed for its declaration to be verified with greater confidence. In cases where the state does not make sufficient information available, verification is more difficult, if not impossible. Relatedly, intelligence information presented to the IAEA by member states must always be properly analyzed in the context of the broader array of data available; otherwise it is of little utility for verification. Such data is not accepted or used by the Agency without further investigation.

Although these examples were based in history, access to locations and information for verification still remains a requirement for verification. Dr. Perricos cited the current example of the recent Geneva Accord between the EU3+3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, plus China, Russia, and the United States) and Iran, emphasizing that access for verification will again be of paramount importance.

Safeguards as the Fundament to Comprehensive Nuclear Disarmament

Andreas Persbo began his presentation by questioning some common assumptions, pointing out that conversations about nuclear disarmament often become metaphysical discussions, for example, whether nuclear disarmament would increase the likelihood of conventional war. Verification, on the other hand, is objective, and separate from the more theoretical issues. Mr. Persbo suggested a practical starting point for a conversation on disarmament is action 30 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which calls for the eventual application of non-nuclear weapon state-style safeguards to all nuclear weapon states (NWS). This would entail all fissile materials be put under safeguards, including all states that possess nuclear weapons, whether or not they are a recognized NWS in the NPT context. This would require study on how to move forward to reach a broader conclusion on the nuclear safeguards obligations of all nuclear-armed states.

View Andrea Persbo's full presentation: Verification in a Disarmed World.

Using Existing Experience in Future Verification

Dr. Nikolai Sokov reviewed experience in bilateral (mostly US-Russian/Soviet) and multilateral verification, both to identify gaps in knowledge and to illustrate how combining different frameworks could produce new answers to existing challenges and useful synergies. He identified three points for comparison: the object (items and activities subject to verification); the scope (verification of weapon elimination vs. verification of irreversibility), and the organization (how the verification process is organized).

Regarding the object of verification, bilateral and multilateral agreements have not overlapped thus far; bilateral agreements have concentrated on reducing delivery vehicles (and only indirectly the number of deployed warheads), while multilateral agreements have concentrated on the nuclear fuel cycle, with no real experience in reducing stockpiles. Regarding scope, there exists a lack of disarmament verification experience; however, some existing IAEA procedures for accessing sensitive facilities may be applicable. Dr. Sokov suggested that a dialogue between the IAEA and nuclear weapon states could be beneficial. Finally, regarding organization, in bilateral arms reductions, parties have verified each other, whereas multilateral regimes have depended on international organizations with broad membership. In his view, the model of near-universal organizations (such as the IAEA, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) could be used in organizing verification of multilateral nuclear disarmament process.

View Dr. Sokov's full presentation: Multilateral Verification.