(Source: Department of Energy)
On 25 June 2015, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) and the Fissile Material Working Group (FMWG) launched the FMWG report entitled "The Results We Need in 2016: Policy Recommendations for the Nuclear Security Summit." The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) is expected to be the final summit of the NSS process, the last such opportunity for states to use this valued process to launch new, effective, and sustainable actions to advance global nuclear security objectives.
In order to develop innovative and actionable policy recommendations ahead of the 2016 NSS in Washington, DC, the FMWG, an international coalition of eighty civil society organizations and individuals with a track record of valued engagement with the 2010, 2012, and 2014 security summits, convened international experts in three policy development groups:
- "Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications," chaired by Ms. Elena Sokova, outgoing VCDNP executive director;
- "Enhancing the Security of Military Materials," chaired by Dr. James Doyle, independent analyst; and
- "Information Sharing, Standards and Best Practices, and Security Culture," chaired by Dr. Anita Nilsson, president of AN & Associates, LLC.
At the 25 June event, Ms. Sokova and Dr. Nilsson delivered presentations on behalf of the groups they chaired; Mr. Nickolas Roth, research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, presented on behalf of the working group on Enhancing the Security of Military Materials. Over forty people—including representatives from Permanent Missions in Vienna, officials from international organizations, and members of NSS Sherpa teams—participated in the report launch event.
The report presents the groups' findings and eleven actionable policy recommendations that could be implemented through the NSS process and beyond:
- Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications
Recommendation #1: Accelerate clean-up efforts and establish a roadmap to the full elimination of HEU in civilian applications. States should focus on establishing concrete paths and deadlines for converting and shutting down all HEU-fueled civilian reactors, either through bilateral or multilateral efforts. Also, states that have current stocks of HEU but do not foresee using it in the near future should commit to removing and downblending the material.
Recommendation #2: Commit to new efforts to deal with more difficult cases, such as pulsed, zero-power, and naval reactors. States should look into non-HEU alternatives for difficult-to-convert reactors and launch dedicated research and development efforts for replacement reactors and fuels.
Recommendation #3: Make unequivocal political commitments to eliminate HEU from all existing non-weapon uses. These commitments can be made through a variety of different formats, such as a consensus Nuclear Security Summit document, gift baskets, or the establishment of HEU-free zones.
Recommendation #4: Ensure sustainability and comprehensiveness beyond the NSS process to continue implementing individual and group commitments to minimize and eliminate HEU and pursue HEU phase-out through other relevant international mechanisms, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) review process, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a dedicated international conference on HEU issues, and/or other fora.
- Enhancing the Security of Military Materials
Recommendation #1: Establish a common interpretation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 obligation to pursue "appropriate effective" actions and commit to specific steps to achieve that standard across the range of nuclear security measures.
Recommendation #2: Provide assurances that military materials are secure while protecting sensitive information. Some ways in which this could be done is through best practice exchanges, voluntary peer reviews, personnel visits, and information sharing.
Recommendation #3: Reaffirm previous international commitments to secure nuclear materials, including, for example, the 2014 NSS Communiqué, UNSCR 1540, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Recommendation #4: Identify appropriate fora beyond the NSS process for advancing discussions and policies. Among possible options to continue this work are meetings of the NPT nuclear weapon states, the Conference on Disarmament, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
- Information Sharing, Standards, and Best Practices
Recommendation #1: Share more information and improve channels to share information. A number of existing channels need to be better utilized for sharing substantive information on a regular basis. It may require additional planning and establishment of regional networks for sharing information, including on best practices.
Recommendation #2: Close gaps in the international nuclear security legal framework to strengthen standards and build confidence. Some voluntary requirements, particularly several IAEA undertakings, should become mandatory. Introduce rewards for good performance and practices.
Recommendation #3: Enhance security culture by reinforcing synergies between nuclear safety, security, and safeguards across the entire nuclear fuel cycle and by encouraging more interaction among stakeholders and across chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear fields.