

The NPT and the Origins of NATO's Nuclear Sharing Arrangements

by William Alberque

Head of Arms Control and Coordination Section, NATO

NATO's Enduring Commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

At the Permanent Mission of Japan

5 May 2017



PRESENTATION OUTLINE

I. The story

- Personal and historical

II. Key findings

- How were NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements addressed during negotiations?
- What were the other key issues to be resolved?

III. The enduring relevance of the NPT




The story of the NPT





- Baruch Plan of 1946
- Irish Resolution 1958, adopted 20 December 1961
- Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (January 1962)
 - 14 March 1962 to 26 August 1969
 - US Draft Treaty 17 August 1965
 - USSR Draft Treaty 24 September 1965
 - UN Resolution 2028(XX) 19 November 1965
 - US revised Draft Treaty 21 March 1966
 - US-USSR joint drafts 24 August 1967, 18 January 1968, 11 March 1968
 - Agreed by ENDC 14 March 1968
- NPT opened for signature 1 July 1968



The Cold War doesn't stop for NPT negotiations



A Researcher's Best Friend: the public record



A Researcher's Best Friend 2: FRUS

- The Foreign Relations of the United States
 - Broken down by President, and then topic area
 - <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments>
- The famous “Document 232”
 - Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense Clifford, Washington, April 10, 1968.
 - The source text was sent under cover of an April 15 memorandum from Foster to Katzenbach, in which Foster recommended that Katzenbach send the letter to Clifford "informing him of the background of the U.S. interpretations of Article I and III before he (Clifford) goes to the NPG meeting at The Hague, April 18-19." Foster also proposed to Katzenbach that he suggest that Clifford make a statement "setting forth our opinion that the NPG will not affect the activities of the NPG."

FRUS Document 232



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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XI, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

232. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense Clifford¹

Washington, April 10, 1968.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Before you go to The Hague for the Nuclear Planning Group meeting on April 18–19, I believe you should be familiar with the US interpretations of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding alliance arrangements for nuclear defense. The FRG has requested in particular that we make it clear that the realization of the NPT will not affect the work of the NPG.

The language of Articles I and II of the NPT was chosen in order to protect alliance consultations on nuclear defense as well as on nuclear defense deployment arrangements. These are not explicitly sanctioned by Articles I and II, since the USSR was not prepared to provide such an endorsement of NATO arrangements.

In Secretary Rusk's October 10, 1966 talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko,² it was

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

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PERSONS

FRUS Document 232

- “In Secretary Rusk's October 10, 1966 talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko, it was clearly understood that Articles I and II of the NPT deal only with what is prohibited and not what is permitted. Article I of the NPT prohibits the transfer of ownership or control of nuclear weapons (understood to mean warheads and bombs and not delivery vehicles). It does not mention alliance consultations or deployment arrangements not involving a transfer of nuclear weapons. We worked out interpretations on these and other aspects of Articles I and II with our allies (and in particular the FRG) which were presented to the Soviets on April 28, 1967 in the form of answers to questions posed by our allies (Tab A).
- The FRG agreed with us that it would not be desirable to request comments from the USSR on these interpretations, since the USSR could not be expected to be bound by unilateral interpretations or a treaty made by others. However, the Soviets were informed that if they took an official position in opposition to these interpretations, a very serious problem would arise. The Soviets also were told that we expected that during ratification hearings the US Senators would ask similar questions as allied governments, and we expected to make the same responses on our understanding of Articles I and II.
- We have not heard from the Soviets any indication that they will contradict the US interpretations when they are made public in the process of consideration of the treaty either by the US or by our allies. This does not mean that they will necessarily agree with them.”

The Famous Four Qs and As

QUESTIONS ON THE DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
ASKED BY U.S. ALLIES
TOGETHER WITH ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES

1.Q. What may and what may not be transferred under the draft treaty?

A. The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted.

It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of "nuclear weapons" or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosive devices because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use.

It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads.

2.Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit consultations and planning on nuclear defense among NATO members?

A. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results.


3.Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons owned and controlled by the United States within the territory of non-nuclear NATO members?

A. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling.

4.Q. Would the draft prohibit the unification of Europe if a nuclear-weapon state was one of the constituent states?

A. It does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.

The Famous Four Qs and As



PENN Research Report 2000.1


Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer,
Tanya Padberg and Dan Plesch

Questions of Command and Control: *NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the NPT*

PROJECT ON EUROPEAN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

British American Security Information Council (BASIS)
Berlin Information-centre for Transatlantic Security (BITS)

Senate Executive H Hearings 1969



NPT Research 101: the US ratification records

- US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings on the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Executive H
- Testimony of Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of ACDA, 18-20 February 1969
 - Fisher testifies that the US has shared the Qs and As with the Soviets, “key members” of the ENDC, and all members of the UN.
 - USSR has not disagreed publicly to date with the interpretations, and “the negotiating history would belie such a claim.
 - “They have not indicated acquiescence or agreement because they can’t be asked to agree about certain arrangements that we keep secret.”

The hidden history: the 4 Qs and As

- FRG asks US a list of 12 questions on the effect of the NPT
- US provides full answers 18 January 1967
- US shares the list with NATO's North Atlantic Council
 - 1 February 1967 First NAC discussion on Qs and As
 - 4 April 1967 US revises Qs and As based on Allied input
 - 28 April 1967 US shares Qs and As with USSR and several other non-Allied ENDC delegations
 - 3 May 1967 US shares final Qs and As with NATO
 - 18 February 1969 US shares Qs and As with Congress and UN



Historical context (1950s-1960s):

- Cold War and emerging nuclear powers
- US-USSR military tensions and escalations
- Security situation in Europe
 - Fears of West Germany in USSR, and in the West
 - France distancing itself from NATO
- Technological developments
 - Increased access to bomb-making know-how and materials
- Need for global regulation (civil and military)
- Emergence of unwritten patterns of behavior to manage crises




US Estimate of Weapons Programs: 1963


<p>TABLE ONE COUNTRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES</p>								
	xxx Major	xx Moderate	x Small	P Potential				
Country	Domestic Availability of Uranium	Nuclear Research Program	Nuclear Power Program	Industrial Resources Capability	Time Required to First Test	Aircraft Operational Capability	IRBM Missile Operational Capability	Motivation To Make Decision
France	xx	xxx	xxx	xxx	done	1964	'69	High
West Germany	---	xxx	xx	xxx	4-5 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	Moderate
Italy	x	xx	xx	xx	5-6 yrs	7 yrs	8 yrs	Low
Belgium	---	xx	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Netherlands	---	xx	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Canada	xxx	xxx	xx	xxx	1-2 yrs	6 yrs	7 yrs	Very Low
Sweden	xx	xxx	xx	xxx	2-3 yrs	5 yrs	8 yrs	Evaluating
Switzerland	---	x	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Japan	x	xx	x	xxx	5-6 yrs	6 yrs	8 yrs	Very low but depends on China
India	xx	xx	x	xx	4-5 yrs	5 yrs	8 yrs	Low but depends on China
Israel	x	xx	P	xx	2-3 yrs	1968	1968	Moderate to High
UAR	---	x	P	x	Over 10	Over 10	Over 10	Moderate to High
Brazil	x	x	P	x	Over 10	Over 10	Over 10	Low
Australia	xx	x	P	xx	---	---	---	Low
Norway	---	xx	x	xx	---	---	---	Low
ChiCom	xx	xx	P	xx	1963 (Possible)	1970	1972	High
East Germany	xxx	xx	xx	xx	USSR Prohibits	USSR Prohibits		---
Czechoslovakia	xxx	x	xx	xx	" "	" "	" "	---
Poland	x	x	P	x	" "	" "	" "	---



The Cold War doesn't stop for NPT negotiations



KEY FINDINGS: Negotiation goals




KEY FINDINGS: NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements

- NATO nuclear arrangements date to the founding of the Alliance
- “Forward Defence” in light of overwhelming Soviet capabilities
 - DC 6-1, MC-48, MC-3/5, MC-14/3
- Key questions: (1) storage, custody, authority to launch;
(2) training, planning and consultation mechanism.
 - 1946: US Atomic Energy Act cut UK off and established law on US positive control
 - 1957: US amends to retain positive control/custody, but host nation agreements
 - 1960: US Concept of Multilateral Nuclear Force at NATO (hardware solution)
 - 1966: Establishment of Nuclear Planning Working Group (software solution)
- *But, what if* – no NATO sharing arrangements?
 - How many nuclear powers in Europe? What kind of bilateral sharing agreements?

The MLF and ANF: a colossal waste of time

- 1960: US comes up with the Multi-Lateral Nuclear Force (MLF) idea, announces it in 61, consults with Allies in 62, sets up PWG in 63
- 1964:
 - April: Johnson convinced it might work, sets up State task force
 - September: Erhard tells press US will give FRG bomb one way or the other
 - November: Kosygin, Gromyko, USSR media all beg Johnson to drop MLF
 - December: Johnson tells Kosygin MLF is dead and leaks NSAM to NYT
- 1965:
 - January: UK
- The Atlantic Nuclear Force is the only fleet that, while it had not been created, it torpedoed another fleet that had never sailed
 - Franz-Josef Strauss, German Defense Minister



The MLF : a colossal waste of time

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The MLF and ANF: a breakthrough

- 1965:
 - January: UK proposes ANF to muddy the waters
 - May: US initiates NATO NWPG to create a software solution
- 1966:
 - 22 September: US and USSR agree to negotiate NPT text in NYC
 - 24 September: USSR condemns MLF in the UN
 - 26 September: Johnson tells Erhard MLF is dead, Erhard accepts
 - 27 September: US and USSR agree to draft NPT Articles I and II text
- The Atlantic Nuclear Force is the only fleet that, while not real, torpedoed another fleet that had never sailed
 - Franz-Josef Strauss, German Defense Minister



KEY FINDINGS: A complex negotiation

- US tries a multifaceted, multi-vector approach to negotiations
- *Five parallel negotiations, all with different players*
 - US-USSR
 - US-NATO
 - USSR-Warsaw Pact
 - US-USSR-ENDC
 - UN



Breakthrough: September 22-30, 1966

18P

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C. Muromcew
R/LS

Approved in S/S BHR 10/14/66
UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Memorandum of Conversation

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation September 27, 1966

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.S.R. United States

Ambassador Roshchin Ambassador Foster
Mr. L. Mendelevich Mr. G. Bunn
Mr. Timerbayev Mr. S. De Palma
Mr. Antiasov Mr. L. Meeker
Mr. C. Muromcew (Interpreter)

COPIES TO: S
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-ACDA - Mr. Foster
L - Mr. Meeker

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 43-114
By: ~~cl~~, NARA, Date: 1-23-96

Ambassador Foster opened the meeting by referring to the pleasant and profitable dinner last Saturday, September 24, and to the statements made there. Secretary Rusk was presently in Washington and would probably soon meet with his Soviet colleague. The question now was how to begin the work.

Ambassador Roshchin replied that the basic position was clearly stated at dinner and he now expected a U.S. response to Minister Gromyko's views.

Amb. Foster felt that alternatives one and three met Minister Gromyko's views on the issue of direct or indirect transfer through military alliances and groups of states, and also on the question of control. The U.S. side was puzzled why the above failed to meet the problem demonstrated by Mr. Gromyko using tea cups and ashtray.

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September 30, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BILL MOYERS

Subject: Working Group Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Relationship to Existing and Possible Allied Nuclear Arrangements.

In accordance with your conversation with Mr. Meeker this afternoon, I am attaching language produced by the U.S. - Soviet working group for consideration by their Principals. As you will see, I am transmitting it in a memorandum analyzing its contents.

Adrian S. Fisher

encl.

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GROUP 1. Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

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ANNEX A

Soviet adjustments in working group draft to meet U.S. objections

Substantive adjustments from prior Soviet texts:


1. The working group draft contains no prohibition against granting to non-nuclear-weapon States "the right to participate in the . . . control or use of nuclear weapons." (Art. I of Soviet Draft). Neither "participate" nor "use" appears in the draft. "Control" does appear but, despite Soviet requests, is not modified by "any" or "participate". Thus, considerably more flexibility would be possible for NATO arrangements than under the Soviet draft or later Soviet suggestions.
2. The working group draft contains no prohibition against granting control over the "emplacement" of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear-weapon State with respect to weapons deployed on its territory. (Art. I of Soviet Draft). This could have had an adverse impact on U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons abroad.
3. The working group draft contains no prohibition on transmitting "information or documentation which can be employed for the purposes of . . . use of nuclear weapons." (Art. I of Soviet Draft). This language could seriously have

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Breakthrough: September 22-30, 1966



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Our Source Was the New York Times



“They have not indicated acquiescence or agreement because they can’t be asked to agree about certain arrangements that we keep secret.”



A QUESTION OF CUSTODY: Realization that NATO forces have fighter-bombers armed with nuclear weapons supplied by the United States has raised issue of control. Here is a line-up of F-104 planes assigned to NATO's Air Forces showing national identifications.

We Are Already Sharing the Bomb

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 27—An underlying irony in all the current diplomatic concern over greater “nuclear sharing” within the Atlantic Alliance is that few seem to realize how far the United States already has gone in sharing atomic weapons with its NATO allies.

The United States, for example, has assigned to West German military forces nuclear warheads with an explosive power far exceeding all the explosives used in World War II. Similarly, the American atomic weapons assigned to French forces in NATO significantly surpass in power and numbers all the atomic weapons that France, in 10 years of efforts and billions of dollars spent, has been able to build for its own independent Force De Frappe.

To a lesser extent, the same holds true for seven other NATO allies—Britain, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Canada. To each of these nations, the United States has made available atomic weapons which their forces could use in time of war.

Nor are all these thousands of weapons kept in a separate bunker, under an American lock which would only be opened in event of war. In the case of all nine allies, some of the weapons actually are mounted on the delivery systems of the foreign forces. Each of the nine countries, for example, has fighter-bombers or interceptors, armed with the nuclear weapons supplied by the United States.

Through a combination of physical and electronic checks, the warheads remain under American control; the planes can not take off

or the weapons be used without permission from the United States. But even with this control, the allies are directly sharing in the use of warheads whose power is measured in many, many megatons.

The extent to which the United States has gone in sharing nuclear weapons with NATO is something that the Administration has preferred not to call attention to, largely because it did not want to flaunt the fact in the face of the Russians. But gradually the fact has come out into the open in the last few weeks, first with a speech by Chairman Chet Holifield of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy describing the megatonnage already available to West Germany and France, and then in a begrudging acknowledgment by the Defense Department this week that some of the warheads were actually mounted on the airplanes of the nine NATO nations.

Law Amended

These “sharing” arrangements date to 1958 when the restrictive Atomic Energy Law was amended to permit the United States to share certain limited information about the external and operating characteristics of nuclear weapons with NATO. The modification was part of a new NATO strategy in which the nuclear punch of the alliance was to be strengthened and diversified by the United States “stockpiling” atomic warheads for use by the allies. Then, as now, there was the argument that the NATO allies must be permitted to have a voice on their nuclear defense and not be forced to rely completely on American nuclear power.

At the time, however, Administration officials gave the impression in public testimony that the warheads would be kept in a separate American stockpile and only turned over in event of war. But as the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy quickly discovered, the Defense Department had gone a step further by actually mounting the weapons on allied planes. It also discovered that the American controls over the weapons, both on the planes and in the separate stockpiles, at times existed more in principle than in fact.

Out of this Congressional concern came the initiative to strengthen the controls. After an inspection trip to Europe in 1960, a subcommittee headed by Mr. Holifield submitted a still top secret report to the incoming Kennedy Administration that pointed up the inadequate custody being exercised over the weapons and recommended tighter physical and electronic controls.

The recommendations of the Holifield Subcommittee lead to the development of what was known as the “permissive action links” on American warheads assigned to the NATO forces. These links are a combination of physical and electronic checks to prevent unauthorized use of the warheads, particularly those already mounted on allied weapons.

These links operate on the principle that it takes a positive action by an American custodian to release the weapons and to arm the warheads. Thus, the German F-104 fighter-bombers armed with American warheads sit on a ramp behind a barricade which can only be lowered at American command.

Armed American sentries stand guard over the planes, and it is only with their permission that the pilots, standing by in a nearby “ready hut,” can enter the cockpits. And then once the “scramble” order is given, it requires an electronic signal from an American command post to arm the warheads.


Not Foolproof

In the opinion of committee members the present controls, although not foolproof, are probably as tight as can be humanly devised.

But now this sharing arrangement has gotten involved in the diplomatic and increasingly political controversy over creating some form of an allied nuclear force to give a greater nuclear voice to the NATO allies, particularly West Germany. Members of the committee are not enthusiastic about the Administration proposal for a Multi-Lateral Force. What more does West Germany want, they are asking?

The military answer is that West Germany wants to “participate” in some weapons systems which are capable of hitting the medium-range ballistic missiles in the Soviet Union which are presently beyond the range of the German tactical weapons assigned American warheads. The M.L.F. fleet of surface ships armed with Polaris missiles would give the Germans that range. But the question being raised by the committee about the existing arrangements portend political difficulty for the Germans and the Administration in reaching that ostensible military objective.

18-Nation Disarmament Committee Records



Hosted by the University of Wisconsin website

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
Our Source Was the New York Times



U.S. and West Germany Confer on a Nuclear Force



Chancellor Adenauer meets with Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Allied commander in Europe



NATO IS PRODDED TO CLARIFY STAND ON ATOMIC FORCE

Kennedy Invites Proposals or Readiness to Accept Dependence on U.S.

By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 6 — President Kennedy said today that an allied nuclear force was not necessary for the defense of Europe and that his sponsorship of it was only a response to European suggestions.

If it turns out that Europe does not want to join in the establishment and financing of an internationally manned force of surface missile ships, he said, he will be prepared to listen to any other proposal or to accept Europe's present dependence on American nuclear power.

For the Administration, this threat came at an inopportune time, since it is preparing for a visit next month by the West German Chancellor, Ludwig

Greater Voice on Nuclear Arms Urged for NATO

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15—The chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy suggested today that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization be given a greater voice in determining when nuclear weapons should be used in defense of Western Europe.

Representative Chet Holifield, Democrat of California, offered this suggestion as an alternative to the Administration's proposal for creation of an international nuclear force within NATO.

The suggestion by the influential Democrat caught the Administration by surprise and introduced a new element of controversy and uncertainty into the debate over how to give the NATO countries, particularly West Germany, a greater voice in their nuclear defense.

Mr. Holifield was highly critical of the Administration's proposal for an international force. The implication was that if the Administration succeeded in working out arrangements for such a force, it might have difficulty in obtaining Congressional approval of the necessary legislative authorization of the force.

For the Administration, this threat came at an inopportune time, since it is preparing for a visit next month by the West German Chancellor, Ludwig



Chet Holifield

Erhard, who is expected to press for adoption of the Administration's proposal for a collective nuclear force within NATO.

At the same time, Mr. Holifield was introducing an alternative that may not be acceptable to West Germany. Under his plan, West Germany would not obtain the participation that it has been seeking in a nuclear weapons system. In-

stead, West Germany and other NATO countries would have "greater responsibility" in deciding when nuclear weapons supplied by the United States would be used.

Mr. Holifield offered his proposal in a speech before the joint annual meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Society.

"The deterioration of unity in NATO demands improvement in command and control structure and in the area of formulation of policy decisions," he said.

As a mechanism for achieving "closer policy coordination" on nuclear matters within the alliance, Mr. Holifield suggested the use of a select committee of NATO powers, such as was proposed last spring by the Defense Secretary, Robert S. McNamara. As proposed by Mr. Holifield, this select committee would define the circumstances under which nuclear weapons would be used, and how they would be used.

Mr. Holifield, however, was deliberately vague on the key question whether the committee would have the authority to decide when the weapons would be used. His point was that the "new formula of policy decision making" was one to be worked out by the Executive Branch in cooperation with the NATO allies.

But he acknowledged the necessity for "modification" of

the present arrangements, under which the United States maintains veto-power over the use of atomic weapons assigned to NATO. And he did not rule out the possibility of the abandonment of this veto control, with the authority to use the weapons handed over to some form of majority control by a select NATO committee.

Mr. Holifield's criticism of the concept of an international force was based largely on the argument that the idea is too concerned with meeting Bonn's desires for a nuclear voice rather than with strengthening the alliance as a whole.

Furthermore, he said, this concept overlooks the fact that West Germany has already been granted "a strong participating role in the nuclear defense of Europe." For example, he said, the United States, under an American control and release arrangement, has made available to West German military units nuclear weapons "whose firepower far exceeds all the explosives of World War II."

"What is needed to improve the alliance is closer policy coordination and a more cohesive working relationship at the highest levels," he said. "In this way, each nation will be better assured that its security is amply protected by the total security of the alliance."

M.L.F. STIRS MAJOR CRISIS IN ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

By DREW MIDDLETON
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Dec. 12—"I read that President Johnson does not think there is a NATO crisis," an experienced neutral diplomat remarked. "Well, he seems to be about the only person even remotely connected with the organization to feel that way."

The situation that will confront the foreign and defense ministers

But the crisis involves the whole future of European defense—whether it is to be dependent on, independent of, the United States; and whether it is to be national or integrated. The crisis also may decide whether, while NATO exists, Europe can aspire to true political unity.

The origins of the situation is the quarrel between France, on one side, and the United States, West Germany and Britain, on the other.

A showdown has long been inevitable between President de Gaulle's concept of military independence within the alliance and the concept of military integration that has been fundamental to NATO for the last 15 years.

Considering the crisis in its largest aspect, it arises from a conflict between two contrary viewpoints on how the North Atlantic alliance is to be organized: Should it be, as General de Gaulle believes, an organization as the Americans, Germans and both an allied military

tional forces in normal times. Only thus, the French President is convinced, can Europe generate the real national military responsibility that will enable her to play an effective part in her own defense.

The United States policy seeks the continuation of military integration within the alliance and its extension to the field of European nuclear weapons by the establishment of the nuclear fleet, to be named by international crews drawn from participating navies.

In pursuit of this proposal, which was prompted originally by European, particularly West German, appeals for a larger share in nuclear strategy, the Administration is apparently prepared to accept expansion of the force to include British strategic bombers and, eventually, British atom-powered submarines armed with Polaris missiles.

The prospects for reconciling the two policies are thin. This is not solely because of General de Gaulle's intransigence, although that is an important ingredient. The main difficulty is that the French Government, while maintaining a steady drumbeat of criticism of the fleet project, failed to offer an alternative.

French Alternative

There have been reports that the Foreign and Defense Ministers are working on a proposal for a Western European nuclear force, but at the moment the sole alternative mentioned by the French, and this only vaguely, is for Europe to rely for nuclear protection on France's independent nuclear force, which is still in the nascent stage.

This does not satisfy the West German Government, whose attitude toward the two conflicting proposals is at the core of the crisis. The Germans, as the largest Continental contributors to the Continent's conventional defenses, want a share in nuclear strategy now, not the promise of nuclear protection from a French force that, whatever its future credibility, is of marginal importance to allied defense at the moment

and will continue to be so until the end of this decade.

The NATO crisis, as the ministers will find when they gather, is a good deal more than a difference over the meaning of words like "alliance" and "protection." In the last two months—that is, since General de Gaulle realized there was a possibility that the mixed-manned force would be established—the split on policy has widened and deepened.

The eight powers that have participated, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, in the talks on the mixed-manned force are members of NATO.

But the force, as it is now envisioned by the United States, will not be a part of the alliance but an auxiliary of it under the Supreme Commander, Europe (SACEUR), who heads an integrated command.

The inclusion of the mixed-manned force within General Lyman L. Lemnitzer's Supreme Command is in keeping with the responsibilities assigned to him by NATO. He is the servant of all fifteen members.

In time of war, SACEUR would control all land, sea and air operations with full authority to carry out such operations as he considered necessary for the defense of any part of the area under his command.

The M.L.F. would be a largely European force established for the defense of Europe and from the outset it has been accepted by the eight interested governments that it would be a force to be used as a subordinate to oversee the fleet's training and equipment may be apportioned.

At Ottawa in May, 1963, NATO's Ministerial Council established a multi-national nuclear command under SACEUR.

This is composed of the three American Polaris submarines assigned to NATO, 12 strategic bombers and 72 light bombers of the Royal Air Force and fighter bomber squadrons with a nuclear carrying capacity, from eight other nations, including two from France.

The chances are that the most

important discussions about the fleet will take place privately rather than in the ministerial meeting. There the conflict is likely to focus on the opposing American and French views about the alliance.

At the moment the United States can count on the support of almost every NATO power except France when it defends integration. The odds will not deter General de Gaulle's astute Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, from attacking the American concept as outmoded.

The best that can be hoped, on the American side, is that the discussions will define more clearly not simply the dimensions of the present crisis but its potential danger to the security of the West.

Security Question

During the last two or three weeks there has developed among some of the smaller NATO members a realization that General de Gaulle's hostility to the alliance in the name of independence could not be isolated from the question of their security within it. They understand, one of their diplomats said, that if the general had his way, the organization on which they depend for defense through integration will be "gutted."

In this fierce conflict, with the stakes so high, a real showdown could stimulate the alliance. For the last four years there has been a tendency, natural enough in view of NATO's importance, to belittle differences, to repeat the old phrases about there being more factors that unite than divide.

In the present crisis the factors that divide France from the United States, Britain, West Germany and the others are of such transcendent importance that they dwarf those that unite. This is a situation that can be resolved only by the frankest and most forceful presentation of the American case, a presentation as powerful as the one General de Gaulle would make if it was necessary.

Only if France's opponents speak out will President de Gaulle, in turn, have to provide some constructive alternative to NATO.

New York Times articles from April 1949 to July 1968 on NATO's nuclear weapons:

~3,000

Lunch Lecture VCDNP | 5 May 2017

Our Source Was the New York Times

Here's 40 more major articles and books on NATO's nuclear weapons policy in English, French, and Russian (1962-1967):

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- Klaus Knorr, A NATO Nuclear Force: The Problem of Management, (Center of International Studies Policy Memorandum, 1963)
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- Claude Ricketts, The Case for the Multilateral Force, European Review, Summer 1963
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- Michel Eyraud, La force multilaterale, (article in Strategie, October 1964)
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- Kai-Uwi von Hassel, Organizing Western Defence, (article in Foreign Affairs, January 1965)
- Wilfrid Kohl, Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the MLF, (article in Political Science Quarterly, March 1965)
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- M. Maratov, Non-Prolifeartion and NATO Nuclear Plans, (article in International Affairs Moscow, January 1966)
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- Dan Cook, The Art of Non-Proliferation, (article in Encounter, July 1966)
- Urs Schwarz, American Strategy: A New Perspective. The Growth of Politico-Military Thinking in the United States (book, Doubleday, 1966)
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- Irving Heymont, The NATO Bilateral Forces, (article in Orbis, Winter 1966)
- John Wiley, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions, (book 1967)
- Pierre Gallois, Paradoxes de la paix, (article in Politique Etrangere, 1967)

See also, the Times of London, Pravda, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, Japan Times, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Survival, Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic Monthly, Hearings of the US Senate and House, Debates of the House of Commons, records of the ENDC and DCOR

NATO Ottawa Communiqué 1963

- Ministers discussed NATO defence policy and approved the steps taken to organize the nuclear forces assigned or to be assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). These include notably:
 - assignment of the United Kingdom V-bomber force and three United States Polaris submarines to SACEUR;
 - establishment by SACEUR on his staff of a Deputy responsible to him for nuclear affairs;
 - arrangements for broader participation by officers of NATO member countries in nuclear activities in Allied Command Europe and in co-ordination of operational planning at Omaha;
 - fuller information to national authorities, both political and military.




The Origin of Verification

“We realize that when we ask the Soviet Union for verification and control, we are asking the USSR to make a unilateral concession; this is due to the nature of our open society. Verification, control and information needs of the Soviet Union are answered by the very fact that our society is open to the extent of 97 percent of these needs. An additional 2 percent are contributed by the fact that people in our government cannot keep their mouths shut. The final 1 percent is accounted for by Soviet espionage, so that there is nothing unknown about us to the USSR...

“It was too soon to expect us to rely on good faith alone--we did need verification, inspection and other assurance...We are not trying to pry or control; all we needed was to find some basis of confidence that when we sign an agreement, the result will be what we anticipated when we signed it.”

- Secretary of State Dean Rusk talking to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, on the sidelines of UNGA, 1 October 1965 (Document 97)



Moving to an end-state

SECRET

ACDA/D. Moser:jh
8/30/67

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in ACDA/D DATE: August 23, 1967

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Edward E. Tomkins, Minister British Embassy
Mr. Ian M. Smart, First Secretary
Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director, ACDA
Mr. Gottfried W. Moser, ACDA/D

COPIES TO: ACDA (17) S/S - 2 (41) CIA - Mr. Dreil
EUR/DNA White House - Mr. Keeny Amembassy LONDON
G/PM DOD/ISA - Dr. Halperin US Mission GENEVA
RPM DISDEL (3)
INR (10) AEC - Mr. Labowitz USUN NEW YORK

1 SEP 1967

Mr. Tomkins came to pay an introductory call on Mr. Fisher. After the opening pleasantries, Mr. Fisher said we have reached agreement with the Soviets to table the non-proliferation treaty tomorrow at 3:00 p.m. Geneva time. The timing will facilitate simultaneous announcement in both capitals. Mr. Fisher said this will not be a joint tabling, to which the Soviets objected; however, the texts will be identical. Mr. Fisher said the treaty as tabled might cause the FRG some pain. They object to the amendments clause which they say may bind them to amendments with which they do not agree. Mr. Fisher said we pointed out to them that with the veto being available to 24 (excluding France) members of the Board of Directors of the IAEA, which at all times will include one non-nuclear EURATOM member, it is difficult to conceive of an amendment passing which the Germans would oppose.

Mr. Fisher said we anticipate much hard negotiation, especially on Article III. He said, however, that Article III, when singled out as a subject, because of general agreement on the rest of the treaty, will not be as difficult to negotiate as previously when it could be used as an argument against taking up the treaty at all. Mr. Tomkins asked why, in Mr. Fisher's opinion, the Soviets

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM DEF 18-6

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INFO: Addressees listed at bottom of page
FROM: Department of State **DATE:** Aug 24 10 04 AM '67

SUBJECT: Aide-Memoire on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (U)

REF:

The enclosed Aide-Memoire (Enclosure 1) contains an explanation of and requests support for the draft NPT (Enclosure 2) which was submitted by the United States and Soviet Co-Chairmen of the ENDC at Geneva on August 24, 1967.

Action addressees should, unless they perceive objections, present the Aide-Memoire and the draft text to governments at the highest level deemed appropriate. Info addressees may draw on them as appropriate in any discussions of the draft NPT, and provide text of treaty.

ENCLOSURES:

- Aide-Memoire
- Draft NPT

INFO: ALL NATO CAPITALS (NATUS/BUSEC) AND THE FOLLOWING POSTS

ADDIS ABABA	HONG KONG	RIO de JANEIRO
BELGRADE	LAGOS	STOCKHOLM
BERLIN	MEXICO CITY	SOFIA
BUCHAREST	MOSCOW	TOKYO
BUDAPEST	NEW DELHI	USUN
CAIRO	PRAGUE	VIENNA (IAEA)
GENEVA (DISTO)	RANGOON	WARSAW

When separated from enclosures: **LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Classified by: ACDA/IR:AMS/ellman; ACDA/IR:EAW/alker:up
Declassify on: ACDA/IR-Mr. De Palma; ACDA/IR-Mr. Kranich; ARA-LA - Mr. Sayre
G/PM-Mr. Garthoff; AFI-Mr. Hadsel; AEC-Mr. Labowitz (Continued on last page)

The story of the NPT


- Baruch Plan of 1946
- Irish Resolution 1958, adopted 20 December 1961
- Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (January 1962)
 - 14 March 1962 to 26 August 1969
 - US Draft Treaty 17 August 1965
 - USSR Draft Treaty 24 September 1965
 - UN Resolution 2028(XX) 19 November 1965
 - US revised Draft Treaty 21 March 1966
 - US-USSR joint drafts 24 August 1967, 18 January 1968, 11 March 1968
 - Agreed by ENDC 14 March 1968
- NPT opened for signature 1 July 1968



NPT signing in London, Moscow, DC, 1 July 1968



Michael Stewart, UK Foreign Secretary, signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty in London watched by David Bruce, US Ambassador, (extreme right) and Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, USSR Ambassador, (second from left). On the extreme left is Harold Wilson, UK Prime Minister, who opened the ceremony.
Photo: Associated Press



Dean Rusk, US Foreign Secretary, signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Washington. On his left is President Johnson and to his right are William Foster, US Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Sir Patrick Dean, UK Ambassador, and Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador, each of whom also signed the Treaty. Photo: Votavafoto, Wien



Moscow when A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, made a statement about the signing there of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The signatories were Leonid Brezhnev, USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Harrison, UK Ambassador, and L.E. Thompson, USA Ambassador to USSR.

Photo: Fotochronika Tass



A step towards general and complete disarmament...



Retrieved from US Department of State Homepage – Office of the Historian (March 2017)



KEY FINDINGS

- NATO and the NPT:
 - NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement;
 - the stationing of US nuclear weapons on the territories of its Allies; and
 - NATO nuclear training, planning and consultation mechanisms **are fully consistent with the NPT.**
- Historical Negotiation Record:
 - NATO's nuclear arrangements predate the NPT;
 - they were fully addressed during the negotiations to achieve compatibility with the NPT;
 - all signatories accepted the arrangements;
 - no objections when the treaty entered into force or for decades afterwards.
 - Further bilateral nuclear treaties (e.g. SALT, INF, and START) limiting NW were signed without affecting NATO's nuclear arrangement.
- Many people misread historical record and ignore joint US-USSR efforts



II. RELEVANCE OF FINDINGS FOR NPT PROCESS

- NPT a cornerstone of global security architecture
 - Only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty with the goal of disarmament;
 - Strong legal framework with security assurances that prevents spread of NW.
- NPT needs to be *protected* and not undermined with accusations. Accusations as political manoeuvres to distract from non-compliance?
- Enhance understanding of NATO's defence and deterrence posture, and of the legitimacy of its arrangements
- Reiterate call to preserve and strengthen Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament regimes



Final Conclusion

