
Verifying Nuclear Disarmament

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Federation of American Scientists



Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

TPNW: 69 signatories and 19 States parties (31 more ratifications needed for entry into force).

To Succeed, the TPNW needs:

- A <u>Framework</u>, including institutional, legal, financial, technical and operational mechanisms.
- And, of course, the TPNW needs nuclear-armed States to sign on.

TPNW States Parties will decide all matters related to the implementation of the Treaty.

When in force, the TPNW will reduce these risks while helping States to disarm.


- 1. Nuclear war, or threats to use nuclear weapons.
- 2. Unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
- 3. Accidental or sabotage detonation of nuclear weapons.
- 4. Unauthorized transfers to any unauthorized person, group or State.
- 5. Theft by a terrorist organization.
- 6. Proliferation.
- 7. Nuclear testing.

My TPNW Institutional, Legal, Financial, Technical and Operational Framework

Supports TPNW by:

-Encouraging States to Sign& Ratify the TPNW

-Providing a Starting Point for Implementation



Contents

- l. Overview
- II. Eliminating weapons and weapon capabilities
 - The international nuclear disarmament agency
 - The technical basis for verification
- III. Sustaining disarmament
 - Preventing rearmament
 - IAEA disarmament missions
- IV. Building the nuclear disarmament regime Legal & Technical Annexes

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The New York Times.

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NEW YORK, TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1945.

THREE CENTS NEW TORK CITT

BOMB DROPPED MISSILE IS EQUAL TO 20,000 TONS TRUMAN WARNS FOE OF A

REPUBLICAN DEA

Isolationist Helped Prevent U. S. Entry Into League-Opposed World Charter

Jet Plane Explosion Kills Major Bong, Top U.S. Ace

Flier Who Downed 40 Japanese Craft, Sent Home to Be 'Safe,' Was Flying New 'Shooting Star' as a Test Pilot

By The United Press BURBANK, Calif., Aug. 6-Maj., "The plane started to wobble up Richard Bong, America's greatest and down, then went into a left

Toyokawa Naval Arsenal Laboratory in Race for

Kenney's Planes Blast 'By God's Mercy' We

Tarumizu in Record

Blow From Okinawa

Beat Nazis to Bomb,

Churchill Says

TAIN Steel Tower 'Vaporized' In Trial of Mighty Bomb

> Scientists Awe-Struck as Blinding Flash Lighted New Mexico Desert and Great Cloud Bore 40,000 Feet Into Sky

> > By LEWIS WOOD Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Richard Bong, America's greatest and down, then went into a least air ace, died today in the flaming bank and hit the ground, "he stated wreckage of a jet propelled fighter tered wreckage over about a block toward the air accompanied toward the air accompanied toward the air accompanied toward the air accompanied toward the steel tower, the following the steel toward the steel WASHINGTON, Aug. 6-A blind- Before the detonation scientists

Day of Atomic Energy Hailed by President, Revealing Weapon

HIROSHIMA IS TARGET

Dust Hides City After

26,725 days since Nagasaki.

Since then, no nuclear wars, no unplanned or accidental explosions, no stolen weapons.

Many States pursued nuclear weapons; most stopped or failed.

4 States abandoned nuclear weapons.


South Africa, Belarus, the Ukraine and Kazakstan

Today, 9 nuclear-armed States:

5 NPT* Parties (Britain, China, France, Russia, United States) 4 additional (DPRK, India, Israel, Pakistan)

*NPT = Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons


Nuclear Arsenals, Adversaries & Allies



Verification Approach

- 1. Apply a "Theatre-Centric" verification approach for success.
- Establish priorities for each nuclear-armed State based on prevailing circumstances.
- 3. Create new International Nuclear Disarmament Agency to address phased elimination of nuclear arsenals. Include an International Centre for Verification Research and Development for classified forms of fissile material.
- 4. Implement appropriate IAEA safeguards to prevent rearmament.
- 5. As appropriate, verify elimination or irreversible conversion of mission-critical nuclear weapon facilities to peaceful use, or non-explosive military use.

International Nuclear Disarmament Agency



Verification Assignments


INDA


- 1. Encourage disarmament;
- Verify arms reductions and fissile material controls at four levels;
- 3. Certify and eliminate missioncritical nuclear weapon facilities;
- 4. Verify non-explosive military use of fissile material
- 5.Estimate historical production or other acquisition of fissile material for nuclear weapons

IAEA

- 1. Disposition fissile material
- 2. Verify converted mission-critical nuclear weapon facilities
- 3.Detect diversion of declared stocks of nuclear material from declared facilities
- 4. Detect undeclared production, processing at declared facilities
- 5. Detect clandestine production
- 6.Estimate and verify historical production

Eliminating Existing Arsenals





Strategic / Tactical Nuclear Warheads


- Missile Warheads (ICBM, MRBM, Cruise)
- Gravity Bombs
- Torpedoes
- Sea Mines
- Artillery Shells
- Man-portable Weapons








Fissile Material in Nuclear Weapons




How could international inspectors verify warheads and warhead dismantlement without revealing design or manufacturing secrets?



Uranium-235 is the only naturally occurring fissile nucleus.

Plutonium is a man-made element.

Plutonium rich in the isotope Plutonium-239 and/or Uranium with high enrichments of Uranium-235 are used in all nuclear weapons.



Fusing the isotopes of hydrogen is the easiest reaction to create.

Verification of Classified Forms of Fissile Material

- Each nuclear-armed State must be satisfied that the methods and procedures will not enable inspectors to gain access to nuclear weapon design or manufacturing secrets.
- INDA must be satisfied that the verification results are based on sound science and are authentic.
- Use of computers in the verification systems opens possibilities for hacking and back-door functions that could circumvent the approval arrangements.
- Ergo, first generation verification systems should include no electronic components.
- R&D should be carried out by scientists from all TPNW States Parties.

Verification determines disarmament value

1*	Pu and/or HEU present?
2*	Isotopics as used in nuclear weapons?
3*	Mass of Pu and/or HEU above specified minimum?
4	Exact mass of Pu and/or HEU verified?
5	Mass of Pu and/or HEU in bins?
6	Total Pu and/or HEU verified?
7	Warhead, pit or secondary?
8	Warhead, pit or secondary model ID?

^{*} Scope of Trilateral Initiative

Moving down allows faster progress, but complicates security approvals.

Possible Methods for Verifying Nuclear Warheads

 Trilateral Initiative: Attribute Verification by Neutron and Gamma Ray Assay


• BNL Thermal Neutron Imaging

Princeton Bubble Chambers


• VA Tech Cosmogenic Muons







• MIT Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence



Elimination / Irreversible Conversion of Mission-Critical Nuclear Weapon Facilities



The U.S. Pantex plant assembles, maintains and dismantles all U.S. nuclear weapons.


Verification Missions

INDA

- 1.Encourage nuclear-armed States to disarm;
- Verify arms reductions and fissile material controls at four levels;
- 3. Certify and eliminate missioncritical nuclear weapon facilities;
- 4. Verify non-explosive military uses of fissile material
- 5.Estimate historical production or other acquisition of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons

IAEA

- 1. Dispose of fissile material
- 2.Convert mission-critical nuclear weapon facilities to peaceful use
- 3.Detect diversion of declared stocks of nuclear material at declared facilities
- 4. Detect undeclared production, processing at declared facilities
- 5. Detect clandestine production
- 6.Estimate and verify historical production



A can-in-canister arrangement could be used to severely impede re-use of plutonium from nuclear weapons, which would also reduce the risks of rearmament and reduce the costs of verification.

Legal Annexes


- A.1: Text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
- A.2: A model INDA Nuclear Disarmament Verification Agreement
- A.3: IAEA model safeguards agreement for sustainable disarmament

Technical Annexes

- B.1: International Centre for Nuclear Disarmament R&D: Installations & initial tasks
- B.2: Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material
- B.3: Inspection procedures for classified forms of fissile material

Confidence Building Measures

- 1. Bilateral arms reduction treaties
- 2. TPNW engagement exercises
- 3. Temporary monitoring of nuclear weapons, warheads, or warhead components
- 4. Controls on warhead refurbishment and remanufacturing
- 5. Export/import controls for nuclear-armed states
- 6. Controls on fusion materials
- 7. Standardizing dismantlement and conversion facility architecture
- 8. Extra-territorial siting
- 9. Antineutrinos
- 10. Subsidizing disarmament



Disarmament won't come quickly, quietly, or cheaply.

VERIFYING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Thomas Shea



Important to start, bring TPNW into force, establish verification framework, commence R&D on methods and procedures.