
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

> { Laura Rockwood Executive Director, VCDNP


Conflict Prevention through Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation in the OSCE Area Vienna International Center 6 May 2019

The Dawn



1938: Discovery of uranium fission: Lise Meitner & Otto Hahn

July 1945: Trinity Test



The Threat



The Hiroshima A-Bomb


Explosive device

Uranium 235

Length 120 inches (approx. 3 metres) Diameter 28 inches (approx. 0.7metre) Weight 9,000 lbs. (Approx. 4 tons) Element Uranium 235

– 6 Aug. 1945: "Little Boy"





Length 128 inches (approx. 3.2 metres) Diameter 60 inches (approx. 1.5 metres) Weight 10,000 lbs. (approx. 4.5 tons) Element Plutonium 239

The First Twenty-Five Years: Creation of the IAEA and its Safeguards System

UNGA resolutio Atomic Er Commiss	n 1: hergy	"Atoms Peace Propos Plan	•		<mark>hed</mark> IRAT	sy (INF)	AEA S ystem CIRC/	26) E	xpansio syst NFCIRC/ & Re	em 66, l	
1945	1949	1952			196	0	19	64	196 ⁻	7	1968
194 US – 1 st and only use of nuclear weapons	USSR NW tes		953 V	19	Frai NW	nce	961 Chir NW to	a	5-68 Lati Ameri NWF Trea open for signat	can Z ty ed	NPT opened for signature

Challenges of the 1950's – 60's

Perceived Risk?

Misuse of *supplied* material and items

Exercise <u>unilateral restraint</u> in sharing technology <u>AND</u> Create independent <u>international</u> verification body <u>AND</u> Develop system for verifying use of <u>supplied</u>

material and items

Early Efforts

- UN General Assembly resolution I/1 (1946): UN Atomic Energy Commission
- <u>1946: Acheson-Lilienthal Rerpot; Baruch Plan</u>
 - International ownership and operation of "dangerous" nuclear activities: Atomic Development Agency
 - US to give up nuclear weapons after controls in place
 - UN AEC effectively defunct by 1949 with nuclear test by USSR



The IAEA: Atoms for Peace

- US "<u>Atoms for Peace</u>" proposal in UNGA <u>1953</u>
- **<u>Statute</u> of the IAEA in force <u>1957</u>**
- <u>Autonomous</u> inter-governmental organization
- Unique relationship with <u>UN Security Council</u>
- <u>Not</u> a <u>UN</u> organization
- 170 Member States
- Authority to implement <u>safeguards</u>



IAEA safeguards

- <u>Membership in IAEA</u> does *not require* acceptance of safeguards
- <u>IAEA safeguards possible in non-Members</u> (and in non-States)
 - DPRK
 - Taiwan, China
- Requires <u>consent of State</u>
 - Voluntary undertaking
 - Security Council Chapter VII
 - Safeguards Agreement




Types of safeguards agreements


• Item Specific (INFCIRC/66-type)

- India, Israel and Pakistan
- Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs)
 - The 5 NPT NWSs: China, France, Russia, UK, US
- <u>Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements</u> (CSAs) (INFCIRC/153-type)
 - In force for 175 of the 186 NNWSs

Critical Path to Weapons-Usable Material



SG Coverage: Item-Specific Agreements




International Arms Control: First Steps

- 1960: Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament
 - Comprehensive approach to disarmament; equal East/West representation
- 1961-1969: Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
 - Addition of Non-Aligned countries
- October 1963: Partial Test Ban Treaty in force
- October 1964: China conducts nuclear test

Regional Arms Control: First Steps

- 1958: Costa Rica proposes regional arms control agreement
- October 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis
- April 1963: Declaration of Denuclearization of Latin America
- February 1967: Treaty of Tlatelolco opened for signature

1st NWFZ: Latin America & Caribbean



1967 Tlatelolco Treaty k Non-proliferation and peaceful use undertakings **RAEA** safeguards on all nuclear activities **Ban on NW testing & OPANAL & Protocols:** ø States with territories in the zone øNWSs – negative security assurances

International Arms Control: Next Steps

The NPT

- k Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva 1965-1967
- k August 1967: US/USSR identical drafts
- k Opened for signature 1968
- k Entered into force 5 March 1970



The Following Two Decades: The Comprehensive Safeguards System

NPT enters into force	Appro NP	RC/153: oved for T SG ements	<u>India</u> "pe	<u>Israel</u> bombs <u>Iraqi</u> a tests <u>reactor</u> at aceful Tuwaitha r device"						4 th NPT Review Conference			
1970	1971	19 71	972 19 ⁻	197		198	35	198	86	19 9	<mark>90</mark> 19		90
NPT Za Comm (Trigge publish 197 INFCIR	ingger nittee er List ned in 74	1 st SG Ag enters i	NPT preemen into for	Nuc ^{nt} Supplier ce (Guid publis	clear ers Gr deline shed 978	roup ^{bec} es n	OPRK comes arty to NPT	δοι	ific FZ aty F ir	 <u>Ira</u> 1va	IAEA "stren	A stai	

Challenges of the 1970's – 80's

Perceived Risk?


Misuse of *indigenous* nuclear fuel cycle

Develop safeguards system for verifying supplied and produced nuclear material in a State

AND

Require <u>export controls</u> for nuclear material and specialized *single use* equipment and material

The NPT: Three Pillars



The NPT

Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs)

•Not to provide nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices to NNWSs (<u>Art. I</u>)

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs)

 Not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (<u>Art. II</u>)
 Accept <u>safeguards</u> on all nuclear material (<u>Art. III.1, 4</u>)

All States Parties

 <u>Export controls</u>: nuclear material; single use items (<u>Art. III.2</u>)
 Facilitate <u>exchange of technology</u> (Art. IV.2)
 Pursue negotiations on nuclear <u>disarmament</u> (<u>Art. VI</u>)

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)

> INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)

THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND STATES REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS



INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

CSA: State's Undertaking


... to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere ...

INFCIRC/153, para. 1

Timely detection of diversion of <u>significant</u> <u>quantities</u> of nuclear material to "the manufacture of <u>nuclear weapons</u> or of <u>other nuclear explosive</u> <u>devices</u> or <u>for purposes unknown</u>"

Deterrence of diversion by risk of early detection

Routine SG Coverage - CSAs



2nd NWFZ: South Pacific



1985 - Treaty of Rarotonga k Non-proliferation & peaceful use undertakings **&** Comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply **Ban on dumping of** radioactive waste **& 3 Protocols:** *π* States with territories in zone *🕫* Negative security assurances Ø No testing of nuclear explosives

Export Controls – NPT & Non-NPT

Zangger Committee (1971) – NPT suppliers

• Trigger List (1974) – Nuclear material and single use items triggering safeguards

(INFCIRC/209)

<u>Nuclear Suppliers Group (1975)</u> – *All* major suppliers

• List of single use items <u>and</u> related technology (1978)

(INFCIRC/254)

Limitations in Traditional SG

- Limited routine *access* frequency and locations
- Little attention to *small quantities* of material
- Focus on <u>declared</u> materials (correctness)
- No assurances of <u>absence of undeclared</u> nuclear material and facilities (completeness)

Limitations in Export Controls

Limited scope and conditions:

- No requirement for <u>full-scope SG</u>
- No controls on <u>dual-use</u> items or items relevant to weaponization
- Limited information exchange:
 - No procedures for exchanging information on <u>export denials</u>


• No provision of information to the <u>IAEA</u> Informal, non-binding

1990: The War That Changed Everything




		T	ne	Nex	xt	De	eca	d	e:				
	Strengthening Safeguards												
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of <u> </u>	l <u>raq</u> 's clear	DPRK: NPT		Africa:	DPRK: non- compliance; report to		" <u>93+2</u> "		<u>Africa</u>	FZ Treaty			
weapons programme		SGA ent into for		smantled weapons			to Board		<u>India,</u> <u>Pakistan</u> NW tests				
1991	199	1 1	1993	1993		1994	19	95	1997	1	998		
	991	1992	1	1993	1993		1995	1990	6-7	1998	2000		
<u>Iraq</u> : UNSC res. 687	C <u>Afr</u> conc	rica Pro	IAEA's ogramme 93+2 nitiated	e <u>DPRK</u> : IAEA detects incon- sistencie	Agr s Frame	<u>DPRK</u> reed ework	<u>NP1</u> extenc indefini	ded <u>4</u> hitely	<u>Moc</u> Additi Proto appro (INFC 540	ional ins <u>ocol</u> wi oved CIRC/	aq: IAEA spectors ithdrawn		

TUWAITHA Activities Declared Prior to 1991



TUWAITHA Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Activities



Challenges of the 1990's

Perceived Risk?

Undeclared nuclear material and activities

Ensure verification of <u>all</u> nuclear material and activities: declared and the absence of undeclared <u>AND</u> <u>Expand</u> export controls to cover dual use items

CSAs: Shifting Perceptions

... the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied ... on ALL source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere ...


INFCIRC/153, para. 2

Redefined Objective

Assurances of *Correctness* and *Completeness* of a State's Declarations

1991-1997: Challenging Years





IAEA to Monitor & Verify Shutdown of DPRK's Nuclear Facility

Model Additional Protocol


Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)

> MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

(Corrected)



SG Coverage – CSA and AP



Export Control Developments

INFCIRC/254:

- Part 1 (1978): "EDP" items, and technology transfer
- Part 2 (1992): Dual-use equipment, material & technology
- Conditions:
 - Full scope" SG as condition for future supplies (1992)
 Exchange within NSG of notifications of denials

INFCIRC/539 (Rev.6): Outreach activities

1997: "The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities" – revised in 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012 & 2015

3rd NWFZ: South East Asia



1995 – Bangkok Treaty Non-proliferation & peaceful use undertakings Comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply Ban on dumping of radioactive waste Protocol:

∞ Negative security assurances
 − not to use or threaten to use
 nuclear weapons in the zone

4th NWFZ: Africa



1996 – Pelindaba Treaty **k** Non-proliferation & peaceful use undertakings **k** Prohibits nuclear weapons research **k** Requires nuclear weapons programme rollback **k** Prohibits attacks on nuclear facilities **& 3 Protocols:** *🕫* Negative security assurances Ø No testing nuclear explosives ø States with territories in zone

9/11



HIJACKED JETS DESTROY TWIN TOWERS AND HIT PENTAGON IN DAY OF TERROR

U.S. ATTACKED

A CREEPING HORROR

Buildings Burn and Fall as Onlookers Search for Elusive Safety

BY N. B. ALEDOFTELD

The barrier sector is provided by the sector of the sector

A sufficient of any other than a sub-



President Vows to Exact Punishment for 'Evil'

BY LENGT BEIMEMONY

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The Last Decade

Initi	resumes SC			DPRK announces Iraq: IA withdrawal inspect from NPT withdra			UNSC Rev resolution AEA 1540: tors non-State					Syria: Dombing of Dair Alzour EIF of Pelindaba & CANWFZ Treaties		
20	02	20	002	20	03		2003	20	04		2006			2009
2001	01 2002		20	2003		2003		2003		2005		2007		
<u>DPRK</u> : <u>DPR</u> enrichment rejects A programme Framew for weapons expels I inspect				reed discovery of ork; undeclared EA enrichment ors programme						nve lear		NW non- ance	e I <u>RK</u> Noun I tes	DPRK xpels AEA ces t UNSC solution 1887

Challenges of the Last Decade

Perceived Risk?

Non-State actors & radiological dispersal devices

Improve physical <u>security</u> of nuclear material & facilities <u>and</u> other radioactive materials

AND

Ensure effective <u>domestic & trans-border</u> <u>controls</u>

Safeguards vs. Security


• Nuclear safeguards:

• Detection and deterrence of diversion of *nuclear material* by a <u>State</u>

• Nuclear security:

• Detection and deterrence of misuse of *nuclear material & other radioactive substances* by <u>non-State actors</u>

2002-2009: More Challenges



Nobel Peace Prize – 2005



5th NWFZ: Central Asia



2006 – Semipalatinsk **Non-proliferation** & peaceful use undertakings **k** Requires a CSA & AP **Bans testing of nuclear** weapons or nuclear explosive devices & Environmental rehabilitation of territories contaminated due to past activities **& Protocol:** ø Negative security assurances: not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons

Single State NWFZ: Mongolia



<u>1992 Mongolia NWFZ</u> № 1992 – Declared itself a single-State NWFZ k 1998 – UN General Assembly recognized **NWFZ** status <u> ≥ 2000 – Mongolia law on its</u> **NWFZ** status **№ 2012 – Declaration with** NWSs on nuclear weapon free status & negative security assurances to Mongolia

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones



56% of Earth's land area of 149 million km²; 60% of 195 States; 39% of world's population

The Present and Beyond ...



Middle East WMD Free Zone?

- 1995 NPT Review & Extension Conference:
 resolution on WMD zone free in Middle East
- 2010 NPT Review Conference breakthrough:
 - UN SG to convene conference in 2012
 - Facilitator appointed
 - No conference convened
- 2015 NPT Review Conference: extremely contentious
 - Middle East WMD free zone
 - Disarmament

Humanitarian Initiative & Ban Treaty

2010 NPT Review Conference

 Expressed deep concern at "catastrophic humanitarian consequences" of use of nuclear weapons; reaffirmed need for States to comply with applicable international law, including humanitarian law

Humanitarian Conferences:

- Oslo, 2013; Nayarit, 2014; Vienna, 2014
- Humanitarian Pledge, 2015 117 States
- Open Ended Working Group, 2016 3 sessions
- UN 1st Committee resolution, 2016
- Negotiations March, June, July 2017



Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 20 September 2017





The New Iran **Negotiations:** 2013 - 2016**& Joint Comprehensive Plan of** Action (JCPOA) 8 14 July 2015 **k** Roadmap for Clarification: *p* Past & present outstanding SG issues - 15 Dec. 2015 **& Implementation Day** ø Sanctions lifted - 16 Jan. 2016 **wUS withdrawal** \$\$ 8 May 2018



Challenges of New Millennium?

Perceived Risks: Nuclear black markets – non-State actors **US/Russian relations – a new Cold War? Disarmament slowdown** – failure of NWSs to fulfil obligations under Article VI of the NPT **ICPOA** - possible collapse **DPRK** – ???

And the implications for the 2020 NPT Review Conference

ToTodarø's Regegiene....

Disarmament

Security

NPT & NWFZ Treaties

IAEA Safeguards



Assurances of Supply

Security Council

Export controls Safety Counter Proliferation

Security Assurances