

Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

The General Assembly,

[pp1] *Recalling* the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first session devoted to disarmament, in particular the paragraphs relevant to verification¹,

[pp2] *Recalling also* its resolution 62/21 of 5 December 2007, in which it took note of the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification², as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of 1990 and 1995³, and the report of the Disarmament Commission outlining general principles of verification elaborated upon or added to those stated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly⁴,

[pp3] *Recalling further* its resolution 71/67 of 5 December 2016, in which it, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of the Member States and to establish a group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament; its resolution 74/50 of 12 December 2019, in which it requested, *inter alia*, the Secretary-General to seek the views of the Member States and to establish a group of governmental experts to further consider nuclear verification issues, including, *inter alia*, the concept of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, as well as the reports of the aforementioned groups of governmental experts,⁵

[pp4] *Recalling further* its resolution 78/239 of 22 December 2023, in which it, welcomes the report of the group of governmental experts to further consider nuclear verification issues, and requested, *inter alia*, the Secretary General to seek the views of the Member States and encouraged the Member States to continue work on nuclear disarmament verification issues,

[pp5] *Recalling further* its resolution 78/22 of 6 December 2023, which, *inter alia*, invites Members States to continue efforts to apply developments

¹ Resolution S-10/2, para.30, 31,50, 91, 92

² A/61/1028

³ A/45/372 and Corr.1 and A/50/377 and Corr.1.

⁴ A/51/182/Rev1

⁵ A/74/90; A/78/120;

in science and technology for disarmament-related purposes, including the verification of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation instruments, and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States,

[pp6] *Reaffirming* the shared commitment to further progress in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that all UN Member states should be enabled to actively engage on an equal footing to this end,

[pp7] *Recalling* the unequivocal undertaking of nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all State Parties to the Treaty are committed under its article VI,⁶

[pp8] *Recalling also* that all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have committed to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations⁷,

[pp9] *Reaffirming* that since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation,

[pp10] *Recognizing* that, while the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the political will of states, especially those possessing nuclear weapons, credible multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities will be fundamental to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

[pp11] *Underlining* that work on nuclear disarmament verification is not an end in itself and is not a prerequisite to progress in nuclear disarmament, and such work should aim to promote and facilitate progress in nuclear disarmament.

[pp12] *Recognizing* that, while the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by its purposes, scope and nature, collaborative multilateral work on tools, technologies, methodologies and procedures needed for nuclear

⁶ 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol.I (NPT/Conf.2010/50 (Vol.I), part.I, paragraph 79.

⁷ 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol.I (NPT/Conf.2010/50 (Vol.I), part.I, paragraph 79 and Action 2 of the Action Plan.

disarmament verification can provide unique practical benefits in support of the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament,

[pp13] Convinced that, irrespective of different positions on the means to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, identifying and developing practical and effective measures of nuclear disarmament verification and monitoring can foster confidence among Member States in a relevant area for peace and security,

[pp14] Convinced also of the particular relevance of enabling States, on a voluntary basis, to participate on nuclear disarmament verification discussions,

pp15] Recognizing that work on nuclear disarmament verification must conform to applicable international legal non-proliferation obligations, national safety and security requirements and the need to protect otherwise sensitive information,

[pp16] Mindful of the role of verification in existing bilateral and multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements,

[pp17] Aware that a considerable amount of knowledge on nuclear disarmament verification has already been assembled by past and ongoing initiatives and partnerships among Member States, and *stressing* the importance of incorporating, as appropriate, their experiences, knowledge and lessons learned in future multilateral discussions on the topic in the context of the United Nations,

[pp 18] Noting the fundamental importance of disarmament education and capacity building to address nuclear disarmament verification challenges and related issues,

[pp19] Noting also the contribution of civil society, academic and research communities to nuclear disarmament verification,

[pp20] Underlining the value of continued efforts on capacity-building on nuclear disarmament verification, on a voluntary basis, to enable interested States to engage on this issue on an equal footing,

[pp21] Underlining also that equal opportunities for women and men should be provided for in nuclear disarmament verification education, training and capacity-building,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views in writing of Member States on the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the United Nations, building on the relevant documents on the matter, particularly its reports referred to in the preambular section;
2. Encourages Member States, in providing their views, to focus on the possible objectives, mandate and modalities for such a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts;
3. With a view to ensuring that all Member States have the opportunity to engage on the matter and provide their views, requests the Secretary-General to also convene three in-person informal meetings on the topic, two of which at the United Nations headquarters in New York and one at the United Nations Office in Geneva;
4. Encourages further the Secretary-General, to also take into account the views of relevant intergovernmental organizations entrusted with verification of disarmament or non-proliferation obligations,
5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its eightieth session for further discussion by Member States, containing options for the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the United Nations, taking into account Member States views through the three informal in-person meetings and written submissions, with separate annexes containing those submissions in accordance with operative paragraph 1;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its eightieth session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”.