

## Concrete Measures and Language on Addressing Space Threats

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This brief provides suggestions for measures and language to support the early pursuit of substantive outcomes in the OEWG on PAROS. These suggestions are informed by the [→Space Norms Atlas](#), a comprehensive review of norms discussed in PAROS processes since 2012. They focus on key issues on the agenda for the OEWG's third session: destructive activities, rendezvous and proximity operations, self-restraint, and the protection of civilian space-based services.

Delegations are invited to discuss and build on these ideas, without prejudice to other substantive input into the OEWG, and consider their adoption into the OEWG's recommendations, UN General Assembly resolutions, declarations at senior government level, or into an international agreement. The brief also links to other resources to support delegations in crafting effective language that benefits from existing texts.

### 6. (c) (ii) Intentional Damage to and Destruction of Space Systems

- States should not conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests. [[→GGE 2024, 17](#); [→UN resolution 77/41](#); [→US moratorium](#); [→Other national moratoria](#)]
- States should refrain from harmfully interfering with space systems where this poses a high risk of escalation, including but not limited to space systems that perform functions for missile launch warning; nuclear command, control, and communications; national technical means of verification; military reconnaissance or intelligence systems; and space systems that support the operation of installations which pose significant risks to public safety if damaged or destroyed, such as nuclear power plants. [[→GGE 2024, 16](#); [→Germany & Philippines 2023, 2](#); [→Ireland 2022, 2](#); [→US Space Command Tenet 3](#); [→ICRC 2023, 3](#)]
- States should ensure that lasers under their control or jurisdiction that generate beams travelling through space do not harmfully interfere with the optical sensors of other space systems, including by conducting risk assessments and taking precautionary measures in line with [→Long-Term Sustainability Guideline B.10](#). [[→Germany & Philippines 2023, 2](#); [→United Kingdom 2022, 6](#)]
- States should refrain from harmfully interfering with terrestrial infrastructure that supports the control of spacecraft or contributes to space situational awareness and space traffic management, including by refraining from cyber operations against such infrastructure. [[→GGE 2024, 16](#)]
- States should ensure that spacecraft under their control or jurisdiction comply with the prohibition of harmful interference to radio services or communications in the Constitution and Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). [[→ITU Constitution, Art. 45](#); [→Radio Regulations, Art. 15](#); [→LTS Guidelines, A.4](#)]
- States should ensure that satellite operators under their control or jurisdiction, including civil, commercial, and military operators, establish and maintain effective communication mechanisms and publish contact information relevant for enabling crisis communication and notifications of potentially harmful interference in compliance with Art. IX of the Outer Space Treaty, including via the United Nations Satellite Operator Contact Hub (UN SOCH). [[→GGE 2024, 19](#); [→UN Secretary-General 2017, 10](#); [→LTS Guidelines, B.1.1 and B.1.2](#); [→United Kingdom 2023, 2](#); [→France 2023, 2](#)]
- States should ensure that satellite operators under their control or jurisdiction, including civil, commercial, and military operators, acknowledge receipt of and respond to messages from other operators attempting to make contact in a timely fashion. [[→Japan 2023, 2](#); [→Desautels 2024, 3](#)]

## 6. (c) (iv) Protecting Critical Space-Based Services to Civilians

- States should not harmfully interfere with space systems, particularly through interference with signal transmissions, optical sensors, and computer systems, in ways that disrupt critical civilian services across national borders, including air traffic control and emergency services. [[GGE 2024, 16](#); [UK 2023, 3](#); [Law of Neutrality](#); [ANU Institute for Space 2022, 6](#)]
- States should review the compatibility of their counterspace capabilities as well as their space security strategies and doctrines with international humanitarian law. [[Art. 36 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions](#); [ICRC 2022, 2](#)]

## 6. (c) (v) Operational and Technological Measures of Self-Restraint

- States should publish in advance information on defence tests and exercises that could interfere with other space systems and space-based services, including at least the operation's timing, location, trajectories, and measures taken to avoid harmful interference in line with Art. IX of the Outer Space Treaty. [[GGE 2024, 19](#); [Chair's summary 2023, 10](#); [Castillo 2023, 2](#); [Hughes 2024, 4](#)]
- Aware that war in space would have catastrophic consequences for all humankind, States commit to developing measures, mechanisms, and instruments that effectively reduce the risk of armed conflict in space as an urgent priority.

## 6. (c) (vi) Rendezvous Operations and Proximity Operations

- States should ensure that rendezvous and proximity operations conducted by spacecraft under their control or jurisdiction comply with international law, in particular, Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter and the Outer Space Treaty, and follow the principles of safety, debris mitigation, and due regard. [[CONFERS Guiding Principles](#); [US Space Command Tenets 1 and 4](#)]
- States should ensure that spacecraft under their control or jurisdiction that are designed to carry out rendezvous and proximity operations are equipped with effective collision avoidance systems and follow trajectories that avoid posing safety risks to other spacecraft, such as collisions and conjunction events. [[US Space Command Tenet 4](#); [ISO Standard 24330, 4.1.2.3, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3](#)]
- States should ensure that proximity operations involving physical contact, such as capture or docking, carried out by spacecraft under their control or jurisdiction are agreed and coordinated with the target object owner, operator, or other responsible party and comply with current international best practices, such as [ISO Standard 24330](#) and sections 4.1, 4.3, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 of the [Guidelines on a License to Operate a Spacecraft Performing On-Orbit Servicing of Japan](#).
- States should publish in advance information about rendezvous and proximity operations that are conducted as part of defence testing and exercises, providing at least the timing, trajectories, and information on measures taken to avoid harmful interference with other spacecraft in line with Art. IX of the Outer Space Treaty. [[Chair's summary 2023, 9](#); [UNIDIR 2023, 4](#); [VCDNP 2025, 2](#)]
- When registering space objects, States should ensure that information about sub-satellites or other objects intended for future separation and independent orbital flight is included in the information submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. [[LTS Guidelines, A.5.8](#)]
- States should ensure the advance publication of information about the release of sub-satellites or other objects from spacecraft under their control or jurisdiction. [[Project Ploughshares 2022, 3](#)]
- States should ensure that the release of sub-satellites or other objects from spacecraft under their control or jurisdiction does not threaten the safety of other spacecraft, including by implementing [Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines B.4.1 and B.5.1](#) on pre-launch and in-flight conjunction assessments. [[Germany & Philippines 2022, 5](#); [Castillo & Seitz 2023, 2](#)]