On 8 October 2014, VCDNP hosted a seminar by Ambassador Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, titled "The US Approach to Nuclear Arms Control in the Second Obama Term." At the outset, he pointed out that Barack Obama began his first term with an ambitious agenda for nuclear disarmament—presented in the 2009 Prague speech—but the legacy at the end of 2016 when he will be preparing to leave office will be modest. The implementation of that agenda encountered two challenges. First, Russia did not share Obama's interest in deep reductions and linked further reductions to other issues. Secondly, at home, Republicans in Congress were skeptical about the president's plans.
The initial agenda included the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to replace the expiring 1991 START I Treaty, transition to a new framework of nuclear arms reductions, ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and other measures. Of those steps, only the first, New START, succeeded, but even that treaty was concluded later than originally anticipated and encountered serious opposition, far greater than expected, during the ratification process. Obama announced his follow-on plans shortly after signing New START. The next step was supposed to address the entire nuclear weapon stockpiles—deployed and nondeployed, strategic and nonstrategic—in a "big" treaty. Ambassador Pifer suggested that the target level might be 2,000-2,500 total warheads for each side. In 2013, at the beginning of the second term, the administration moved away from the idea of a "big" treaty to an approach that treated further reductions of deployed strategic weapons on one track and the other weapons on a parallel track. The first track foresaw a protocol to New START or parallel statements by the two parties on further, roughly one-third reductions of deployed strategic warheads; the other track would begin with confidence building measures that would eventually result in reduction of nondeployed (reserve) strategic weapons and nonstrategic weapons to equal aggregate limits for each party. The US would reduce its preponderance in the number of reserve strategic warheads, which would be balanced, under that scenario, with Russian reduction of its superiority in the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Ambassador Pifer also proposed that, before the events in Ukraine precipitated an ongoing crisis in US-Russian relations, there had existed a possibility that Obama could even announce unilateral US reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by one-third. That possibility proceeded from the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the 2013 NPR implementation study, which indicated that the US military could go down by one-third, to about 1,000 deployed strategic weapons, even if Russia were to remain at the New START level of 1,550 warheads. Of course, against the backdrop of the crisis, unilateral reductions are no longer politically feasible.
With regard to nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), the speaker proposed that the optimal way forward could be to begin with a range of transparency and confidence building measures, such as exchange of data on the numbers and locations of these weapons, agreement on keeping weapons separate from delivery vehicles, commitment to avoid an increase in the number of NSNW, discussion of doctrines, and other measures. At a later stage, the parties could discuss ways to confirm the implementation of these measures. He shared his opinion that in 2012 NATO missed an opportunity to reduce the number of US NSNW stored in Europe. He said that complete withdrawal should not be a precondition for dialogue as Moscow insists, as the United States and NATO would not agree to that, but complete withdrawal might be the outcome of a negotiating process, depending on the treaty's overall terms.
Touching upon the future of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Ambassador Pifer stated that US concerns about Russian violation of that treaty—same as Russian concerns—should be discussed at the appropriate level, and that the first such meeting recently took place. He believes, though, that the United States should not withdraw from the INF Treaty, citing the example of the Reagan administration, which patiently discussed its concern about the Soviet compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and was able, not only to resolve those concerns, but also conclude important arms control treaties.
Ambassador Pifer also touched on other issues that Russia links to further nuclear arms reductions. With regard to missile defense, he noted that Moscow insists on a binding treaty; while such a treaty might be appropriate at a future point, Pifer maintains it is not necessary at this time, given the very limited size of the planned US system and technological challenges. He suggested that greater transparency (including, for example, exchanging data on the currently planned number of interceptors, the planned number for the next 10 years, and advance notification of changes in missile defense capability) is feasible and would be a sufficient way to address missile defense at the current stage. Such measures were proposed by the United States in April 2013. If they could resolve their missile defense differences, the parties could move toward greater cooperation, including interaction between the US/NATO and the Russian missile defense systems, a data fusion center, as well as a planning and operations center. Such steps were discussed in 2011 following the November 2010 NATO Lisbon summit.
With regard to conventional forces in Europe, the main goal now should be to ensure transparency, since all European states are already below the limits established by the 1989 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. This effort could build upon, for example, the 2011 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures or the 2002 Treaty on Open Skies. Long-range conventional weapons and ballistic missiles would be captured by New START, while hypersonic glide vehicles (still in development) represent a niche capability and could be addressed in existing regimes.
Ambassador Pifer also touched upon the status of CTBT ratification in the United States. He noted that the issue remains a priority for the administration, but the White House will not publicly move on it unless there is a chance of a successful vote in the Senate. Considerable efforts have been undertaken to lay the groundwork for ratification, and now the administration has much better answers to questions that blocked ratification in 1999.
