Prohibition of Military Attacks on Nuclear Facilities

12 September 2022 • 
Commentary, Nuclear Security, Publications
VCDNP Non-Resident Senior Fellow John Carlson has written a new article discussing the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities.
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The following is an excerpt of an article written by John Carlson, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, VCDNP. The full article was published on 12 September 2022. It is available below.

Grossi talking about one of the earlier shellings of the plant
Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, talking about one of the earlier shellings of the Zaporizhzhia plant; Photo Credit: Dean Calma / IAEA

The war in Ukraine, particularly fighting around the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, has drawn the world’s attention to the danger presented by military attacks on nuclear facilities. Such attacks could cause widespread radioactive contamination, affecting civilian populations not only in the state concerned but potentially well beyond that state. This danger highlights the need (a) for clear international legal rules prohibiting military attacks on or near nuclear facilities, and (b) for all states to observe such rules.

Prior to Zaporizhzhya there had been several attacks on nuclear facilities, in most cases before the facilities concerned had commenced operation.  Fortunately none of these attacks resulted in significant radiation releases:

  • In 1980 Iranian aircraft attacked Iraq’s Osirak research reactor, then under construction, damaging ancillary buildings but not the reactor itself.
  • In 1981 Israeli aircraft destroyed the Osirak reactor.
  • From 1984 to 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq launched several air strikes on Iran’s two Bushehr power reactors, then under construction, causing major damage.
  • In 1991 and 1993, during the First Gulf War, the United States attacked the Tuwaitha research centre and other nuclear targets in Iraq.
  • In 2007 Israeli aircraft destroyed Syria’s al-Kibar reactor. This was a plutonium production reactor supplied by North Korea and built in secret.  At the time of the attack the reactor was close to start-up.
  • The most recent example involved a non-state actor – in July 2014 Hamas launched unsuccessful rocket attacks against Israel’s Dimona reactor.

Read the full paper

 


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John Carlson
Non-Resident Senior Fellow

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