"All Options on (Latency) Table: The Impact of Carrots and Sticks on Nuclear Latency Roll-Back"

26 June 2018 • 
Event
On 25 June, VCDNP held a seminar by Rupal N. Mehta (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark (Georgia Institute for Technology) and Paige Price Cone (University of Chicago).
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What is the best way to achieve a reversal of a latent nuclear programme? What specific tools are better suited for allies than for adversaries? Are negative inducements more effective than positive ones? These questions were discussed by Rupal N. Mehta (University of Nebraska Lincoln), Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark (Georgia Institute of Technology) and Paige Price Cone (University of Chicago) on 25 June 2018 at a seminar hosted by the VCDNP and moderated by VCDNP Executive Director Laura Rockwood.

The three researchers, together with Molly Berkemeier from Texas A&M, have recently completed the first part of a larger ongoing research project that aims at identifying ways in which traditional counter-proliferation strategies impact State decision-making with regard to nuclear latency. The term “nuclear latency” is generally described as the technical capability to rapidly and indigenously produce a nuclear weapon, often driven by a political decision to do so. For the purposes of the first part of their study, the researchers confined the definition to the existence of uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing capabilities in a State.

The motivation for the research was many-fold. The researchers argued that nuclear latency should be as significant a concern to the international community as nuclear weapons, highlighting the fact that roughly a dozen States have pursued nuclear weapons whereas the number of “latent” States was as high as thirty-one. Secondly, although extensive literature on causes and consequences of nuclear latency already exists, some questions still remain unresolved, e.g., what can the international community do to reverse nuclear latency? In particular, can traditional counter-nuclear weapons proliferation tools be applied in nuclear latency cases? The latter includes negative tools (sticks) such as economic sanctions, preventive war, threats of sanctions or use of force, and positive tools (carrots) such as diplomatic recognition and international inclusion, economic and/or military aid, extended deterrence, which could be studied separately or simultaneously to provide a more holistic approach.

The hypotheses of the research consisted of two statements: the extension of positive tools, or positive inducements, should increase the likelihood of nuclear latency reversal; and the extension of negative inducements should increase the likelihood of nuclear latency reversal. The data used for the research was limited to States with nuclear latency between 1946 and 2008 and included, among others, competing risks of latency reversal and nuclear acquisition (dependent variable), positive and negative inducements (independent variables), affinity with the United States, State capability and domestic determinants (control variables). The researchers used the data mostly related to US activities because of the lack of open source information on other major world powers.

The researchers then presented their preliminary findings. In particular, they found very little support for the impact of counter-proliferation policies on latency reversal, even when cases of alliances were considered. Furthermore, pressure by the US did not make latent States more likely to give up their enrichment and reprocessing capabilities or to engage in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. One of the researchers also added that inducements only work when they are credible. As a result, there was a need to identify other, more specific counter-proliferation levers.

At the further stages of the project, the researchers plan to expand the scope of analysis to explore the role of other major world powers in the reversal of nuclear latency in third States, focus on specifically nuclear-related tools, such as economic sanctions on nuclear behaviour and military assistance tied to development of weapons of mass destruction, and identify other international institutional tools, including verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency, export controls, and restricted supply from Member States of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The researchers were commended for their study and received both comments and questions from the audience. One participant underlined the volatility of variables depending on a State, to which the researchers replied by referring to the data available only on a small number of cases that made it more difficult to have a better representative sample. Others suggested that the researchers also should study the repatriation of reprocessed spent fuel to a State and the level of democracy in a State. The researchers thanked participants for their comments and agreed to contemplate the inclusion of those issues into the further research.

Feature Photo by Alan O'Rourke


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