On 24 September 2015, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation held a seminar by Dr. Matthew Harries, Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Managing Editor of Survival, entitled "Disarmament as Politics: Lessons from the Negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Article VI." Dr. Harries discussed the history of the NPT negotiation and particularly its Article VI on nuclear disarmament, as well as the implications for today's nuclear disarmament debates.
Dr. Harries began by examining two main schools of thought regarding the role of nuclear disarmament and Article VI in the NPT. One school of thought argues that Article VI of the NPT represents one-third of the bargain made between state parties to the Treaty. In this interpretation, disarmament has equal weight in the NPT as the other two pillars: non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. By contrast, the other school of thought views the NPT as predominately a non-proliferation treaty, where the main bargain was among the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) who committed not to pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for their neighbors' similar restraint. Disarmament is therefore viewed as a secondary aspect of the Treaty, with Article VI as more of a symbolic concession by the nuclear weapon states (NWS). Dr. Harries contended that the real answer was somewhere in the middle.
Dr. Harries reviewed the history of US and Soviet motivations for, and approaches to, negotiating the NPT, highlighting in particular Soviet concerns about NATO's plans for the creation of a Multilateral Nuclear Force and US willingness to forgo the project for the sake of concluding a non-proliferation treaty. The Cuban missile crisis and tensions over Berlin highlighted the necessity of nuclear arms control for the two superpowers and provided additional impetus for NPT negotiations. Although disarmament provisions were not part of the identical NPT drafts tabled by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1967, there was an understanding that progress on arms control and the cessation of the nuclear arms race would be needed in order for the negotiations and the sustainability of the Treaty to succeed. Article VI was included in the text at the insistence of NNWS. According to Dr. Harries, implementing the disarmament measures, as well as engaging in international debates and initiatives on disarmament—such as the recent Humanitarian Initiative—remains important for the political bargain underlying the Treaty.
At the same time, Dr. Harries noted that the drafters of the NPT resisted attempts to make a direct and concrete linkage between non-proliferation and disarmament in the Treaty text. Neither NWS nor NNWS believed that conclusion of the Treaty should be conditional upon inclusion of specific disarmament measures. Article VI, Dr. Harries argued, was meant to commit states parties to pursue disarmament negotiations, but could not oblige NWS to conclude such negotiations.
Dr. Harries's research indicates that, as negotiations progressed, the NPT was not meant to be a conclusive solution to the challenge of proliferation, and that, for the two major NWS, there always remained space for bilateral and other initiatives. Furthermore, for at least some NWS, the NPT and non-proliferation did not necessarily take priority over other strategic interests, in particular bilateral and alliance relations. Dr. Harries cautioned, therefore, against the belief that the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT is of such overwhelming value to the nuclear powers that they are willing to pay any price for its success. This has implications for the NPT review process and the degree to which NNWS can effectively push for further disarmament measures in the context of the NPT and its review.
Applying his findings to the current disarmament debates and the 2010-15 NPT review cycle, Dr. Harries noted that the growing division on disarmament between NWS and NNWS is a dangerous one. The NPT review process served to reinforce the consensus around the treaty's centrality to the non-proliferation regime and international security. If the NNWS were wholly unsatisfied by NWS' progress on nuclear disarmament, this might lead them to refuse to participate in the rhetorical reaffirmation of the NPT through the review process. At the same time, Dr. Harries observed, the current risk of a reemerging nuclear arms race made reaffirmation of the NPT, and its Article VI, particularly important.
For more information, consult Dr. Harries paper on the lessons from the negotiation of NPT Article VI.
