Last to escape, first to disarm? Three scenarios of peace and war on the Korean Peninsula
11 September 2018 •
Briefs and Factsheets, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, Publications
VCDNP Senior Research Associate Ulrich Kühn's take on possible futures for the Korean nuclear crisis.
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VCDNP Senior Research Associate Ulrich Kühn has written an article for the Heinrich Böll Foundation, detailing his take is possibilities for the Korean Peninsula.
Ulrich Kühn, Senior Research Associate
"In 2018, political relations on the Korean peninsula are in flux to an unprecedented degree. Back in the summer of 2017, the possibility of a friendly visit of North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un to South Korea would have seemed far-fetched. Even more unrealistic: the prospect of a potential summit between Kim and US President Donald Trump, openly discussing the possibility of a full de-nuclearization of the North and a lasting peace framework for both Koreas. “What is real, and what is illusion?” we might ask ourselves. Is it really possible that Kim Jong-un, after decades of strenuous efforts from North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons, and after being punished by the international community with the most rigid sanctions regime, will simply give up his ‘ultimate insurance’ policy? Would Washington truly be ready to consider withdrawing its forces from the peninsula as a result of a comprehensive peace agreement? And what could all that mean for East Asia and Europe?"
Taking note of the amount of variables still in play, one can only speculate as to what the future will hold for the Korean Peninsula. Bearing this in mind, Kühn actively speculates in this article about three broad possible scenarios, including: (1) diplomacy and deterrence; (2) peace and retreat; and (3) war and turmoil. He analyzes each scenario according to its likelihood and potential impact on the international community and leaves the reader to contemplate them.
The full article, published by the Heinrich Böll Foundation on 4 September 2018, is available here.
Non-Resident Senior Fellow John Carlson explains how the proposed use of high-assay low enriched uranium may impact IAEA safeguards and the non-proliferation regime.
On 8 April 2021, the VCDNP hosted the launch of the 2020 edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor in cooperation with the Permanent Missions of Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand.
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