Non-Proliferation Lessons Learned

On 19 September 2018, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) hosted U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Dr. Christopher A. Ford, for a seminar on “Non-Proliferation Lessons Learned.” The public event was live-streamed and attended by over a hundred in-house guests. Dr. Ford’s remarks were followed by a question and answer session.

In his remarks, Ford underscored the benefits and lasting success of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – a treaty which just celebrated the 50th anniversary of its opening for signature. Ford identified three cases of what he referred to as “regime learning”: (1) efforts to ameliorate proliferation risks from civil uses of highly enriched uranium (HEU); (2) the success of the Additional Protocol in facilitating the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and (3) the successes of the IAEA’s "State-level concept" in implementing safeguards. At the same time, Ford pointed to one as-yet unresolved question in need of serious attention; the issue of withdrawal from the NPT.

Referring to the three “success stories” or “instances of regime learning,” Ford made the case for learning from them in order to ensure that the NPT will continue to thrive and survive, not only for the next couple of years but in the next decades to come. The ability of the regime to adapt to changing geopolitical and technical circumstances was identified by Ford as critical. Starting from the NPT principle of supporting the peaceful use of civil nuclear energy under Article IV of the treaty – first proposed by U.S. President Eisenhower in his “Atoms for Peace” initiative – Ford reminded the audience of the historical legacy of many countries previously embracing civil nuclear technologies that relied on HEU, thereby inadvertently creating a number of proliferation risks. The subsequent efforts of the international community and particularly of the United States and the Russian Federation to help countries convert research reactors to use low enriched uranium (LEU) as nuclear fuel and to repatriate HEU was cited by Ford as a successful effort at regime learning. In particular, Ford underscored the value of the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative. According to him, these risk-reduction efforts helped strengthen the NPT regime.

With regard to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol and the implementation of safeguards, Ford embarked again on an historical excursion, starting with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In response to the clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapons programme, uncovered in the aftermath of the 1990 Gulf War, the IAEA changed its policy and agreed on an augmented set of verification measures in the form of the Additional Protocol in 1997. The Additional Protocol, amongst other benefits, gives the IAEA broader access to information and locations, thus also strengthening the non-proliferation regime built around the NPT. Yet, as Ford also reminded the audience, that does not mean that the Additional Protocol is an unchallenged success story, particular in light of certain States not having an Additional Protocol in place. Referring to President Trump’s message to the General Conference, Ford insisted that the Additional Protocol is the new global safeguards standard, should be universalized, and should be made a condition for nuclear supply.

Another success story in support of the NPT regime was identified by Ford in the realm of implementing nuclear safeguards, specifically the State-level concept (SLC). As originally foreseen, the SLC allowed the IAEA to optimize the implementation of safeguards in States for which the “broader conclusion” (that all nuclear material of the country remained in peaceful activities) had been drawn. It only makes sense that the SLC, which is a mechanism for making more efficient and effective use of its verification resources, is applied to other States as well, consistent with their respective safeguards agreements. In his view, objections that called into question the IAEA’s authority or objectivity were a danger to the non-proliferation regime.

Turning to what Ford termed an “incomplete response” by States Party to the NPT to withdrawal from that Treaty, he identified a task that is still awaiting “regime learning.” The first and only case of a party to the NPT deciding to withdraw from the Treaty was North Korea’s 2003 announcement. Until today, North Korea is the first and only country that has taken that step – an action which, according to Ford, continues to undermine the security benefits that Parties derive from the near universality of the NPT. While so far NPT Parties have not yet found an answer to that challenge, Ford remained hopeful that they could agree on principles and concrete responses to help prevent States from misusing the withdrawal provision of the NPT.

In the ensuing question and answer session several topics were raised by the audience, amongst them NPT Article VI disarmament commitments, the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the negotiation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (WMDFZME), the potential verification of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the NPT 2020 Review Conference (RevCon), efforts to bring about a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the state of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

While declining to engage in an extended debate about nuclear-weapons-States’ NPT Art. VI commitments, Ford pointed out that the approach of this administration with regard to the JCPOA is to replace the agreement with a better one, ideally with such negotiations beginning before the 2020 NPT RevCon, thereby significantly strengthening the NPT. While praising the Additional Protocol as the global standard and as a necessary condition for nuclear supply, Ford also underscored that, in a country with Iran’s track record of noncompliance, the Additional Protocol alone is not sufficient for effective verification, citing the most recent release of a trove of documents allegedly documenting Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear arms. The continued use of other weapons of mass destruction (in particular chemical) in the Middle East and Iran’s proliferation of delivery vehicles in the region was cited by Ford as a reason why efforts to launch a process towards a WMDFZME have failed so far.

While seeing no prospect for U.S. CTBT ratification, Ford underscored this administration’s support for efforts to move closer towards an FMCT. At the same time, he made clear that U.S. skepticism towards the CTBT does not pertain to the organization overseeing its implementation, the CTBTO, which supports the International Monitoring System monitoring seismic events. Ford was particularly supportive of the IPNDV and “Quad” which he praised as a significant effort in a series of important steps to help make nuclear disarmament more feasible. In a last remark, Ford reminded the audience that the current U.S. administration is the “exact opposite” of a unilateral actor on the international scene. It is instead, a trusted partner in support of the work of organizations such as the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that really work to strengthen global non-proliferation norms.

Read Dr. Ford's opening remarks here.

Watch Dr. Ford's opening remarks below: