2020 NTI Nuclear Security Index: Results and Recommendations

On 19 September 2018 the VCDNP and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) held a webinar on the 2020 NTI Nuclear Security Index. Three speakers from NTI – Ambassador Laura Holgate (ret.), Vice President for Materials Risk Management; Samantha Neakrase, Senior Director for Materials Risk Management; and Jack Brosnan, Program Officer for Materials Risk Management – discussed the results and recommendations of the Index and its relevance to Vienna-related issues, such as strengthening the global nuclear security architecture. The webinar was moderated by VCDNP Executive Director Elena Sokova.

The Index tracks country-level progress on nuclear security. It also recommends actions for governments to secure nuclear materials and facilities against theft and sabotage and to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. Developed with the Economist Intelligence Unit and informed by an international panel of respected nuclear security experts, the NTI Index has been released biennially since 2012.

For the first time, this year’s edition contains a separate assessment, without scoring or ranking countries, of radiological security policies, commitments and actions taken by 176 countries. The assessment has revealed the weakness of the international architecture for radiological security based on low numbers of adherence to relevant international agreements and initiatives. In addition, many countries do not have adequate regulatory frameworks for regulating radioactive sources or have not made commitments to replace the most dangerous type of sources with alternative technology in a sustainable manner.

The speakers mentioned three areas of concern revealed by the 2020 Index. First, due to the absence of high-level political attention, such as the momentum generated through the Nuclear Security Summits, nuclear security is no longer in the spotlight. Hence the lack of significant progress and the decline in the number of countries that have improved their score in the Index. It was thus recommended that countries strengthen and sustain political attention on nuclear security by, for example, sending high-level delegations to the International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) or using 2021 review conference for the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) to highlight progress and pledges on nuclear security.

The second concern is a gap between the scope of domestic nuclear security regulations and modern challenges, such as cybersecurity, insider threat prevention and security culture. While it is indisputable that every country with weapons-usable nuclear materials and nuclear facilities needs strong regulations, special attention is needed in countries that are interested in acquiring nuclear technology for research or energy purposes.

The speakers then provided a detailed analysis of major concerns related to the global nuclear security architecture. The following four areas were discussed:

1. Countries without nuclear material are not sufficiently engaged in efforts to bolster the global nuclear security architecture, which is reflected in low rates of adherence to the amended CPPNM, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism or additional voluntary commitments. These gaps could be exploited by terrorists with nuclear ambitions and diminish public confidence in benefits from peaceful use of nuclear materials and technology for energy and other applications. To address this problem, the international community should work to build a stronger, more inclusive narrative about the importance of nuclear security. This narrative will, among other things, help to move away from a zero-sum approach that pits nuclear security against technical cooperation in peaceful uses. The approach should explain how the two go hand in hand and emphasize the link between nuclear security and public support for peaceful use of nuclear technology.
2. Notwithstanding its important role in nuclear security, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) still lacks the political and financial support it needs to fulfil its nuclear security mission. The Index recommends that countries increase their financial and political support to the IAEA by contributing to the Nuclear Security Fund and reducing the number of conditions attached to these contributions. All countries should also increase their support and participation in IAEA initiatives, such as, for example, the Incident and Trafficking Database and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, and assure high-level representation at the next ICONS in 2024.
3. Except for publishing regulations, countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials and/or nuclear facilities still take limited actions to build confidence in nuclear security through information sharing and peer review. Further confidence-building steps should include publishing annual reports, making public declarations about nuclear security progress at various fora including ICONS, increasing transparency around both civilian and military nuclear material stocks and submitting information to the IAEA on laws and regulations related to the amended CPPNM. All countries with nuclear material or nuclear facilities should also host IAEA peer review missions, publish their summaries and further support these missions by lending expertise.
4. Nuclear security-related IAEA information circulars (INFCIRCs) – the newest international tool for demonstrating commitment to nuclear security – are still not widely used outside of countries that participated in the Nuclear Security Summits. It was thus recommended that more countries subscribe to these instruments and that more work be done to promote these INFCIRCs and ensure countries’ understanding of the role these instruments play in promoting continuous nuclear security improvements.

A recording of the webinar is available below.