On 3 December 2014, VCDNP hosted a seminar by Robert Einhorn, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former nuclear negotiator in the Barack Obama administration, titled "Prospects for a Nuclear Deal with Iran." The event took place the week after Iran and the UN Security Council permanent members and Germany (the P5+1) failed to meet the 24 November deadline for a comprehensive solution. Instead, the parties decided to extend the interim agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action until 30 June 2015.
Mr. Einhorn noted that the upbeat statements given by the United States and Iranian officials are indicative of the shared commitment to the diplomatic efforts: while Iran suggested that the talks are close to completion, the United States referred to real and substantial progress. Einhorn, however, warned that such statements might be misleading, as the prospects for a comprehensive deal are far from certain.
Remaining divisions
According to Mr. Einhorn, the most contentious issue in the nuclear talks is Iran's capacity for uranium enrichment. The United States wants significant reductions in the number of Iran's operational centrifuges in order to delay Iran's capability to quickly produce enough highly enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon, should Iran decide to break out of the agreement (the parameter is known as "breakout time"). The remaining number of centrifuges should be sufficient to supply fuel for Iran's research reactors, whereas fuel for power reactors would continue to come from Russia. Iran, for its part, defends the right to keep its current number of operational centrifuges during the agreement and to ratchet up its enrichment capacity quickly after the agreement expires with the view to produce fuel for the Bushehr power reactor. Significant differences also exist on the duration of the comprehensive agreement: the US position is fifteen to twenty years, but Iran wants a shorter time-frame, perhaps five to ten years.
The second area of contention is the timing and phasing of sanctions relief. Mr. Einhorn said that the Obama administration is prepared to suspend the most consequential US sanctions on Iran's oil industry and its central bank, soon after the agreement is reached. At the same time, he did not think it is realistic to expect the US Congress to lift (or terminate) sanctions until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reaches a broad conclusion that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. Iran, however, wants greater predictability on sanctions relief, he explained: given the uncertainty of congressional action, Iran objects to postponing the lifting of sanctions until the IAEA conclusion.
Additionally, Iran must cooperate with the IAEA to address concerns about the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's past activities. Although the United States does not expect a "full confession" from Iran, it views the IAEA investigation as essential for confidence building, arguing that Iran's cooperation in this area has been insufficient. Iran, for its part, says it is cooperating, while at the same time arguing that the evidence related to PMD is baseless and fabricated.
Progress
Despite these existing challenges, Mr. Einhorn acknowledged that the talks have made significant progress. Iran has agreed to redesign the Arak reactor to reduce its production of plutonium, even though it is still unclear whether it will remain a heavy water reactor or be turned into a light water reactor. There also seems to be tentative agreement on the underground site at Fordo and Iran's stockpiles of low enriched uranium (LEU), although Mr. Einhorn said the details are yet to be nailed down. Tentatively, the purpose of Fordo would shift from enrichment to research and development while LEU stockpiles would be shipped to Russia to be converted into fuel.
Mr. Einhorn argued that the extension of the interim agreement in itself is a positive outcome. Diplomats successfully avoided a breakdown of the talks, all critical aspects of Iran's nuclear program remain frozen, and most sanctions against Iran remain in place.
What next?
Mr. Einhorn said that the most critical developments will take place in the capitals. President Obama needs to convince the Congress not to impose new sanctions on Iran. In addition to undermining the negotiation process, this could also negatively affect the international coalition behind the sanctions. Mr. Einhorn was confident in the administration's ability to continue the talks, despite the pressure from Congress. However, he was less confident about President Hassan Rouhani's ability to ensure the necessary flexibility in Tehran.
Prospects for a comprehensive deal
Mr. Einhorn pointed out areas of US flexibility in the nuclear talks. He mentioned that the United States had moved from its previous demand for zero enrichment capacity to accepting that Iran could have some capacity to enrich uranium (the precise scale of that capacity is subject to negotiations). The initial US position of limiting the number of operational centrifuges to 1,500 had also gone up, apparently reflecting the tentative agreement on limiting Iran's LEU stockpiles.
Mr. Einhorn argued that the Iranian side has not matched US flexibility. One can only speculate about the reasons behind Iran's lack of flexibility, he said. Mr. Einhorn suggested that Iran may feel that it is in a strong position and could wait for the United States to accommodate to the Iranian position. Iran could also have decided that it can live without a nuclear deal. Or, perhaps, Iranian leaders just find it too difficult to back down on publicly stated benchmarks such as the announcement by the Iranian leader that Iran needs a 190,000 separative work units of uranium enrichment capacity and the remark by Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, that such a capacity needs to be achieved by 2021. Khamenei's support for the nuclear talks thus far, Mr. Einhorn thought, is based on the assumption that Iran can get a deal largely on its own terms.
The success of these talks will be decided in Tehran, Mr. Einhorn said. Given his lack of confidence in Iran's ability to show flexibility, however, Mr. Einhorn remained cautious about the prospect of the parties reaching a comprehensive deal by the new deadline.
