Six Questions on Naval Nuclear Propulsion and IAEA Safeguards

Significant attention has recently been paid to the nuclear safeguards implications of naval nuclear propulsion programmes in non‑nuclear‑weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The second edition of the VCDNP’s “Governing the Atom Brief Series” examines relevant provisions of the NPT, the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and INFCIRC/153 – the document which informs the structure and content of comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) concluded between States and the IAEA pursuant to the NPT. In particular, it includes an analysis of the compatibility of such provisions with naval nuclear propulsion. The brief also analyses practical implications of naval nuclear propulsion. For example, what would an arrangement for the withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards for non‑explosive military use entail? Would the IAEA’s Board of Governors need to approve such an arrangement? How might the above affect current or future naval nuclear propulsion programmes in non‑nuclear‑weapon States?

The “Governing the Atom” brief series” presents easily digestible and factual information to experts and government representatives on critical nuclear governance issues and  aids States in  their decision making in critical issues related to working with international organisations and regimes, including the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Comprehensive Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty Organization, as well as on arms control and disarmament, nuclear export controls, nuclear security, and other relevant topics.