On 20 May 2014, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) and the Heinreich Böll Foundation co-hosted a seminar to present a new publication entitled "The Future of Arms Control." The speakers included Dr. Oliver Meier, associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Dr. Nikolai Sokov, senior fellow at the VCDNP, and Anne Finger, research fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Gregor Enste, head of the Foreign and Security Policy Section at the Heinreich Böll Foundation, moderated the event.
Mr. Gregor Enste introduced the publication that discusses nuclear arms control and disarmament in changing and challenging political times. Nuclear disarmament, he said, has been a central element of the German Green Party's foreign policy, with whom the Böll Foundation is associated. The new publication, which includes materials from a September 2013 international conference in Berlin, addresses a range of key questions: How can international cooperation on nuclear arms control and disarmament be strengthened? How can the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) be prevented in internal conflicts? How can international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation be sustained in situations where the UN Security Council is divided?
Dr. Oliver Meier focused on three different types of arms control: the traditional arms control approach, based on strategic stability and limitations on deployed weapon systems; non-proliferation instruments aimed at limiting the spread of WMD and associated sensitive technologies; and the humanitarian arms control approach, focused on preventing human suffering caused by weapons during and after armed conflict. In light of the recent crisis over events in Ukraine, Dr. Meier suggested that the relative importance of the traditional, Cold War-type arms control approach is likely to grow in the near- to mid-term. In his view, the impact of this crisis on the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime has been limited, at least so far. The West and Russia continue to cooperate on key non-proliferation challenges, such as Iran and Syria. Both the United States and Russia clearly realize, he said, that collaboration on non-proliferation remains in their own best interest. Dr. Meier also discussed the possible impact of the Ukraine crisis on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He noted that Russia's violation of the security assurances contained in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum have greatly damaged the credibility of Russia as a security guarantor and thus undermined the value of security guarantees more generally. He acknowledged that some have interpreted the crisis to be an indicator of the potential value of nuclear weapons. He posited, however, that had Ukraine not relinquished nuclear weapons after the breakup of the Soviet Union, this may not have prevented Russian annexation of Crimea. He pointed out that Ukraine never had complete control of the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Ukrainian decision makers also realized that the cost of trying to keep those nuclear weapons was prohibitive, both financially and politically. This makes it difficult to draw a straight line from the Ukraine crisis to other non-proliferation states of concern, such as Iran and North Korea.
Dr. Nikolai Sokov noted that while President Barack Obama's "reset" policy toward Russia produced initial progress (the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, foremost), it nearly grounded to a halt subsequently. One reason for the stalemate is differences in the approaches of the two parties: while the United States concentrates on the reduction of nuclear weapons, Russia favors an "integrative" approach, which includes missile defense, modern conventional weapon systems, and other issues in addition to nuclear arms control. The other reason for the stalemate is the impact of domestic politics in both countries on the arms control and disarmament process, which has reached unprecedented proportions not seen during the Cold War. Dr. Sokov then addressed an emerging new challenge to nuclear disarmament. While many recognize Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons as an offset to Western preponderance in modern conventional capability, that policy represents a temporary fix. Russia actively seeks to acquire a modern conventional capability of its own, and when it succeeds—which will likely occur by the end of this decade—some NATO members will likely see it as a threat and might insist on responding by increasing the Alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons. To prevent this unfavorable development, Dr. Sokov advocated developing a new set of norms that would address modern precision-guided long-range conventional weapons of all basing modes (land-, air-, and sea-based).
Anne Finger examined France's nuclear policy and, in particular, the justification by French political and military leaders for maintaining the nuclear arsenal. First, nuclear weapons are seen as inextricably linked to guaranteeing France's "ultimate defense" in case of a major threat to its survival. In France, the crisis over Ukraine was regarded by many as proof that it is difficult to predict such threats and thus it would be wise to maintain defense against unforeseeable developments. In this context, France claims that its nuclear weapons guarantee not only its own security, but also that of the European Union (EU), as France's vital interests are inseparable from those of the EU. Second, nuclear weapons grant France a freedom of action that protects France from coercion and blackmail. Some maintain that France had the freedom to oppose the 2003 war against Iraq because its policies are not limited by a reliance on external security guarantees. Third, France's nuclear posture is regarded as a symbol and a guarantee of its role and status as a responsible global nation. Fourth, the conventional forces of the navy and the air force perceive an interest in preserving the nuclear components as they assure a level of excellence for all forces that might otherwise not be obtained—in terms of standards of security and safety, training, and equipment. Other factors that lend support to preserving the nuclear deterrent include industrial lobbying and the École Polytechnique background of officials in charge of the program. Ms. Finger also noted that debates on nuclear policy in France are limited to a relatively narrow circle of experts, both civilian and within the military, and as a result, nuclear policy and its justifications remain largely opaque.
