On 20 October 2015, the VCDNP, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and the Verification Research, Training and Information Center (VERTIC) co-hosted a panel discussion on the dismantlement of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme. The panel featured Dr. Nic von Wielligh, who oversaw the dismantlement of South Africa's programme prior to its historic accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Also on the panel was Von Wielligh's former colleague at the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa (AEC), former Manager of Safeguards of the Department of Licensing and Safeguards Neville Whiting, who provided insight on the AEC's reporting process. Jean du Preez, Chief of External Relations at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), joined the panel in his capacity as a former South African Foreign Service officer. As the former head of the of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Special Team for Verification of Disarmament in South Africa, Dimitri Perricos— also former Acting Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)—provided valuable insights from the IAEA's perspective of the verification process. Laura Rockwood, VCDNP Executive Director, moderated the event.
Dr. von Wielligh provided some highlights and a brief overview of The Bomb: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme, his recently published book (co-authored with his daughter, Lydia von Wielligh-Steyn). South Africa had, in the late 1970s and 80s, secretly built six-and-a-half nuclear bombs and unilaterally dismantled them following then-President F.W. de Klerk's decision to do so in 1989. Originally published in Afrikaans, von Wielligh's authoritative insider's account of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme and its dismantlement will enrich understanding of South Africa's historic decision and its implementation.
Jean du Preez contextualized South Africa's political decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. Noting that history is often forgotten, or worse, rewritten, du Preez commended von Wielligh's book as the most comprehensive account on the subject, which contains documents previously unavailable to the public. When assessing South Africa's nuclear weapons history, du Preez stressed that it was important to appreciate the mindset of the political elite and the perceived threat perceptions of the apartheid regime. Facing a losing battle in the proxy wars in Angola and other neighboring countries as well as increasing international isolation, regime officials believed that they alone, in the words of former President de Klerk, were "defending their country against what they perceived to be the aggressive expansion of Soviet communism." This perception led to the government's propaganda slogan of "fighting the total Communist onslaught." The political leaders at the time came to view nuclear deterrence as the only option and a last resort after all else has been exhausted. With regime change and shifts in the external security environment (including the collapse of the Soviet Union), the de Klerk government believed that nuclear weapons were no longer needed.
Du Preez recalled his personal experiences in liaising with Mr. Pik Botha—South Africa's longest-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs—during the design stage of a small sculpture of a plough (made from non-nuclear metal recovered from one of South Africa's dismantled nuclear devices) which was to be donated to the IAEA. Botha's career spanned every phase of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme, from inception to relinquishment. He was personally involved in leading many important international negotiations pertaining to South Africa's nuclear status. The sculpture, presented by Botha in 1994 to the IAEA's Director General Hans Blix, was symbolic of the "new" South Africa's commitment to disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The base of the sculpture bears a quotation in Afrikaans and English from Isaiah 2:4: "And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore." The plough sculpture was on display at the seminar, generously on loan from the IAEA for the special event.
Following its signing of the NPT on 10 July 1991, South Africa had eighteen months to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The submission of its initial report on all nuclear material and facilities was due within two months of the conclusion of the agreement. Whiting shared insights on his responsibilities in preparing the report, and ensuring correct and complete information for the IAEA inspectors. "Doc Nic's team"—as Whiting referred to the AEC team responsible for preparing South Africa's initial report for the IAEA—consisted of seven staff members who dedicated four years to this task. Whiting noted that South Africa had no experience with comprehensive safeguards and had not had access to the IAEA Board of Governors for a decade. They thus effectively entered into the arena at a disadvantage, but their strength was the team's knowledge of nuclear material accountancy, enrichment, and design. Between 1991 and 1993, there was a near continuous presence of IAEA inspectors in South Africa, with 22 missions and 150 inspections, averaging about six inspections per month. Conducive to efficient proceedings, Whiting recounted that the congenial tone of communications and relations between the IAEA inspection teams and the AEC team was set early on in the process.
South Africa's initial report under its safeguards agreement was recognized by the IAEA as the most comprehensive report ever submitted to the Agency. Dimitri Perricos attested to the professionalism of the AEC's team. Perricos praised the South African team for its transparency, co-operation, and trustworthiness, noting that IAEA inspections in South Africa began in November 1991 in parallel with inspections in Iraq, which had placed great strain on the personnel at the IAEA. The availability of original reports, operating records, and logbooks of plant operations was extremely useful and crucial to facilitating the verification process.
The IAEA's positive experience in South Africa (and the less positive experience in Iraq) effectively changed the culture of inspections and improved the credibility of the inspection authority, argued Perricos, citing several points to this effect. First, that declarations made by a state are critical to the effort. However, inspectors must necessarily question and examine information provided to it, follow the paper trail, and conduct interviews with relevant personnel. Secondly, the IAEA learned that a good technician can always find a way to utilize available equipment despite sanctions: much of the equipment used in the South African nuclear weapons programme was just below the sophisticated level prohibited by import sanctions.
The Bomb: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme is available to order from On the Dot Distributors, Bellville, South Africa (e-mail: orders@onthedot.co.za). For additional information about book distribution, contact Ms Theresa Papenfus, Litera Publikasies/Litera Publications, (theresap@litera.co.za) and Noel Stott (nstott@issafrica.org).
