On 17 June 2019, experts from the United States and the Russian Federation met in Vienna, Austria to discuss current issues and potential avenues of cooperation on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) challenges in the Middle East. Hosted by the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), this meeting was the seventh in a series of dialogues organised by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS).
Participants in the dialogue featured a number of former senior officials, including: former Ambassador of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament Sergey Batsanov; former Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament and to the International Organizations in Vienna Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov; former Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Islamic Republic of Iran Alexander Mariyasov; and former Acting US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas Countryman.
The dialogue also featured a number of “next generation” specialists, including Sarah Bidgood, CNS Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program; Dmitry Konukhov, CENESS Senior Research Associate; Noah Mayhew, VCDNP Research Associate; Dr. Hanna Notte, Political Officer at the Shaikh Group; Nikita Perfilyev, CENESS Consultant; and Anastasia Shavrova, CENESS Research Associate.
Participants began the dialogue with a discussion of chemical weapons (CW) issues in the Middle East with a particular view to discerning the impact of recent uses of CW in Syria on the US-Russian bilateral relationship. While participants agreed that US-Russian cooperation in ridding Syria of its declared chemical stockpiles in 2013-2014 was positive, disagreements in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) have led to a stall in CW cooperation.
Critical going forward will be to learn how the US and Russia can step back from the paralysis caused by political grandstanding in the OPCW. On a practical level, bilateral meetings should continue on CW issues, but they should be kept low-level and technical to avoid becoming overly politicised. The subject of the OPCW’s right to assign attribution in cases of CW attacks, granted to it in June 2018, might be a topic of one of these meetings. Finally, many participants commented that the Syrian conflict will likely have to be resolved before further progress can be achieved in the chemical domain.
The second session addressed the future of nuclear energy in the Middle East. During the discussion, participants characterised the incentives for Middle Eastern countries to pursue nuclear energy on one hand and the associated proliferation and nuclear security challenges on the other. In the backdrop of a growing demand for electricity between 2005 and 2010, 13 Middle Eastern countries announced plans to build 26 NPPs with 90 reactors by 2030. However, due to economic setbacks, security concerns associated with the rise of terrorism and Arab Spring, as well as safety concerns sparked by the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, most of those plans have been delayed or abandoned. As of 2019, ongoing construction works at different stages are being conducted in four countries: Egypt (4 units, construction site approved in April 2019), Iran (the only country in the region that already has an operating unit at the Bushehr NPP and is building 2 additional units) and Turkey (4 units) – all contracted by Rosatom; United Arab Emirates (4 units) – by KEPCO.
A significant point of discussion during this session was the comparison of American and Russian nuclear supply arrangements and conditions with Middle Eastern countries. There was an understanding reached in the audience that a comparative study of Russia and the US supply agreements could be initiated to continue this debate. In addition, the US and Russia could also engage in more regional outreach and training, in particular to technical personnel, to ensure the quality of nuclear infrastructure, as well as best practices implementation in safety, security and safeguards. Enhanced coordination between the US and Russia on these matters has the potential to prevent proliferation in the region and improve regional stability.
The problem of nuclear testing and the need for entry into force of the CTBT was addressed during the working lunch. Participants discussed the Trump Administration recent accusations that Russia was violating the CTBT by not adhering to a zero-yield standard. Among the concerns that were expressed was the possibility that the accusations might be a signal of plans by the Trump Administration to withdraw the US signature from the Treaty.
Discussions during the third session about the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran were pessimistic. One participant made reference to the “utterly calamitous” effects of the US decision not to renew sanctions waivers against Iran, effectively withdrawing the US from the JCPOA. Participants expressed various views about what the future of the JCPOA may hold, from the slim chance that the JCPOA could survive without US support should the INSTEX be fully implemented, to more grim projections that Iran may withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The final session of the day addressed the prospects of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ). Participants emphasized the impact that this issue could have on the 2020 NPT Review Conference. Discussion also focused on the likely outcome and implications of the UN General Assembly mandated Conference on the Middle East scheduled for November 2019.
Despite the difficulty of the issues discussed during the workshop, participants found that they were often in agreement. Continued US-Russia coordination and cooperation in the Middle East was viewed as important to promoting stability in the region and preventing proliferation. During closing remarks, several participants emphasised the need for constructive, cool-headed approaches to Middle East WMD issues. Several participants remarked on the value of substantive and sustained dialogue between the US and Russia, including through the continuation of informal discussions like those in the CNS-CENESS track 1.5 dialogue series.
